Home – Home – Jornals – Philosophy of Sciences 2019 number 4

The paper considers and analyzes capacities of deductive organization for theoretical knowledge and revelation of its ultimate foundations. An analogy with the search of foundations of mathematics as it was realized by Frege’s logicism leads to the problem of foundation of theories in experimental natural science. The analysis shows that the analogy with mathematical theories implies a certain view of natural science when assumptions of specific basic primary truths are expected to exist in each scientific discipline.

The history of a computer metaphor in empirical and theoretical doctrines concerning consciousness and the brain is complex and ambiguous. It is difficult to deny a heuristicity of analogies between principles of computer work and some cognitive processes in the human mind. However, weaknesses of computationalism were inherited by some points of physicalist approaches to explaining the nature of consciousness. Along with a traditional criticism of physicalism, there arises a line of an anticomputationalist kind. The article considers attempts to rehabilitate physicalism with the help of informational realism through a special ontological status of information objects and special characteristics of data semantics. One of our tasks was to show that these attempts just emphasized the gap between semantics and ontology of information. In this context, a particular status is acquired by the concept of informational significance which makes it possible to connect physical properties of a process with properties of a repertoire in an abstract algorithm "representing" this process.

The article reviews publications on the problem of reproducibility of experimental results of post-nonclassical science. The main attention is paid to the review of reproducibility indicators. The notion of reproducibility is discussed in the light of different models of the effect size. The relationship of the concepts of “reproducibility of the effect size and the existence of phenomena is considered. Some results of the project led by Brian Nosek are examined. As an empirical testing of the well-known thesis of non-reproducibility of results of parapsychological experiments, we carry out meta-analysis of the results of experiments in remote viewing.

The article studies the problem of normativity in the framework of naturalized epistemology. The latter is compared with the traditional approach to epistemology, in which normativity is a consequence of the a priori truth of statements. Since there is no a priori truth in the naturalistic approach, it is either necessary to find another source of normativity, or reformulate the concept in an appropriate way. It is proposed to consider descriptive judgments as normative without resorting to additional sources of normativity. At the same time, the naturalistic fallacy can be avoided by considering the evolutionarily developed epistemic mechanisms of human.

The article deals with the study of possibilities of applying abductive reasoning within the philosophy of mathematics to choose the best theory of foundations of mathematics. We consider the concept of simplicity of mathematical proof and its relation with convincingness. In the context of foundations of mathematics, we raise the problem of the criterion of foundations simplicity, reveal difficulties of its application, and outline ways for further studies of the methodology of the philosophy of mathematics.

The article shows that the formalization method is not universal. Firstly, mathematization does not make it possible to answer certain questions, e.g. those related to the essence of knowledge. Secondly, mathematics is quite suitable for presenting knowledge in the field of exact science but is less adequate for being used in the humanities. Thirdly, not all mathematical disciplines are used in applications; it is rather the task of applied mathematics. Fourthly, even in applied mathematics, not all its branches have a universal application. To determine the applicability of a mathematical result, we introduce the concept of the basic property of the studied object of a mathematical theory. A property is called basic if it is used to prove main results of a mathematical discipline. For example, in the probability theory and classical mathematical statistics, probability distribution and independence function as such properties. Since it is difficult to guarantee the determination and verification of the probability distribution and independence of random variables based on the data under study, the probability theory and classical mathematical statistics are not universally applicable.

The article raises and considers the problem of the completeness of philosophical conceptions in the formation and development of nonclassical physics.

Within the contextual realism in respect to the philosophy of physics, we focus on a correct understanding of the concept of physical reality, the necessity of taking into account a categorical distinction between the ideal and the real, and the context dependence of ontology of physical reality. The problem of theoretical access to physical reality, or the problem of a “gap” between a physical theory and reality (i.e. theory application), is a pseudo-problem. This is an instantiation of the Wittgensteinian rule-following problem. In particular, the quantum “measurement problem” is a pseudo-problem. The dualism of the quantum observer and the observed system is rejected. At the same time, there is a difference between them. However, this difference is not substantial, but categorical, and depends on a point of view. The contextual realism makes it possible to explain quantum correlations causally and locally as correlations in the context.

The article considers how quantum computers influence consciousness. The history of the creation of quantum computers and the problems which get in developers' way are briefly described. It is noted that the creation of quantum computers became possible due to changes in thinking. The development of technology raises serious theoretical and philosophical problems. In the article, the conclusion is made that it is necessary to modernize the generally accepted style of thinking based on binary logic.

The article considers key approaches to understanding artificial intelligence, namely the concepts of strong and weak artificial intelligence, as well as the connectionist and symbolic approaches. The concept of intelligence is clarified and its connection with the concept of consciousness is analyzed. The conclusion is made that the functioning of the intelligence (both natural and artificial) requires phenomenal and reflexive levels of consciousness.

The article discusses the concept of fact, as well as other basic concepts of the situation semantics as they are given in A. Kratzer’s version of this approach. The advantages of the method for their constructing which is used by Kratzer over the method used by J. Barwise and J. Perry are revealed. Particular attention is paid to functions of Kratzer’s concept of fact in the semantics of epistemic attitudes, as well as in the theory of a special ("strong") kind of consequences which is distinguished in the situation semantics.

The authors’ goal is to describe the contribution of the Soviet biologist A.A. Lyubishchev to the statement and development of the problem of organic purposiveness through comparing his approach with those developed by his contemporaries. The article produces an attempt to carry out a comparative study of the approaches of two Soviet scientists, A.A. Lyubishchev and I.T. Frolov, to teleological issue in biology basing on their crucial works: the article "The Problem of Purposiveness" by Lyubishchev (1946) and the thesis "Determinism and Teleology" by Frolov (1958). The paper explicates conceptual systems used by the scientists, reveals and analyzes features of definitions of determinism and teleology in the history of science, marks out basic principles of epistemological strategies used by two scientists, and conducts a comparative analysis of these principles. The authors conclude that A.A. Lyubishchev (along with I.T. Frolov) was one of the first Russian scientists who proposed to introduce elements of non-classical science into biology.