Home – Home – Jornals – Philosophy of Sciences 2018 number 2

The article compares Spinoza’s and Descartes’ positions regarding the problems which they solve both partially similarly and in a considerable different way. This made it possible to reveal the trend in the development of Spinoza’s philosophical thought when proceeding from Descartes’ position. The main thing in this trend is that Spinoza rejects Descartes’ dualistic combination of the materialistic orientation based on achievements in science with the commitment to the Christian religion and therefore to philosophical idealism. In Spinoza’s philosophy, its monistic character goes with the predominance of materialistic orientation. At the same time, it is recognized that there is only the predominance of the latter and not the final overcoming of religiousness and idealism.

The paper considers the logico-semantical concept of the model as a special interpretation of the deductive formalized theory. Understood in this way, the model of a theory is a real system of objects which satisfies its axioms. This notion of the model arises from Tarski’s theory of truth and, in this case, the model is represented by real objects. However, it is more natural to consider a theoretical conceptual system as a model of real systems. The structuralist view of theories as predicates that determine possible application domains is a more natural understanding of the relation between the model and the simulated area.

The article deals with the representation of formal systems on the base of the distributive normal form of first-order logic. We show that in such systems, according to the depth of decomposition of the distributive normal form, one may demonstrate consistency combinatorially by means of the system itself which makes it a system with a «built-in» consistency. We draw an analogy with elementary arithmetic formal systems where the Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem is not true. We compare combinatorial syntactic methods of demonstrating the consistency of a formal system and metatheoretical evidence of consistency.

The paper explores various estimates of the material adequacy of Mises’ frequency interpretation. Thus, pure mathematicians believe that it is not necessary, since the idea of chance is successfully studied in Kolmogorov’s theory of complexity. The philosophers de Finetti and Popper also deny the importance of frequency interpretation, believing that its main results can be obtained in other interpretations. The paper shows the uniqueness of frequency interpretation, for example, for the creation of a unified interpretation of the theory of Shafer’s probabilities. It also analyses various estimates of the formal correctness of frequency interpretation. Thus, some pure mathematicians criticize the formal imperfections of Mises’ interpretation, while applied mathematicians note its creativity. Our own argument in favor of frequency interpretation is that according to Mises, his theory is not a mathematical science, but a strict natural scientific discipline about mass phenomena. Therefore, the available critical arguments cannot falsify Mises’ theory.

The paper analyzes key features of thought experiments, their scope and functions with the focus on thought experiments understood as normative models. It provides arguments for special importance of these models in sciences. The paper notes some problems, such as the need to rely on intuitions in the course of thought experiments as well as the gap between the hypothetical and counterfactual nature of these models on the one hand and the requirement of feasibility on the other. It also notes the potential of the method of reflective equilibrium for working with intuitions in the course of thought experiments.

The article revises and evaluates some models of a scientific theory, which are popular in philosophy of science. Models are classified by the number of describing levels (those are empirical, theoretical and metatheoretical ones), viz. as one-level, two-level and three-level models. We show that, in general, such models do not correspond to actual scientific activity. It is concluded that in order to be more consistent with scientific practice the theory should be made of two interrelated levels: a theoretical (model and mathematical) level and an operational one which largely corresponds to A.I. Lipkin’s scientific theory model.

The article considers Richard Dawid’s arguments in favor of the thesis that a physical theory may be «confirmed non-empirically». This means increasing the degree of confidence that such a theory is empirically applicable. According to Dawid, the string theory has the status of a confirmed theory, despite the lack of empirical data. In particular, we analyze his «no alternatives argument». We conclude that the role of mathematics, theoretical and purely rational arguments in physics will increase, so one may regard some empirically non-confirmed theories as plausible or even true theories. The string theory is a possible candidate for being one of them. At the same time, we assert that the inference to the best explanation is a more fundamental principle than the «no alternatives argument».

Discussed 6-th Hilbert problem in the context of understanding the physical metologii of cognition. Justifying the thesis according to which physical knowledge is arranged not by Hilbert, Hilbert arranged set of concepts that is the basis of modern physics, especially the «non-classical»

Is justified by the views of the author, according to which explicitly philosophy plays a role in physics during the crisis of the old and the formation of a new physical picture of the world.

The enactivist approach, whose main principles were formulated in the 1990-s, has its origins in the phenomenological tradition. The authors of the approach sought to combine the scientific view of consciousness with philosophy of subjectivity, the carrier of which is always the bodily living being. In accordance with the phenomenological tradition, it is stated that consciousness, the body and the world cannot be considered in isolation from each other, since they are a unified system. In the philosophical aspect, enactivism follows phenomenology of M. Merleau-Ponty, who regarded the active living body as a basis of cognition. The peculiarity of the approach is a synthesis of phenomenology and data of modern neurophysiology. The paper characterizes the basic theoretical principles of the enactivist approach and gives examples of its supporters’ arguments.

The article considers the earliest available evidences which show the influence of practical navigation information gathered by ancient travelers and discoverers on emerging theoretical geography. The analyzed sources are dated back mostly to the 6th century B.C. and related to the Peripatetic school in Athens. These include the Circumnavigation of the Inhabited World attributed to Pseudo-Skylax and fragments of geographical works of Aristotle’s follower Dicaearchus of Messana.

The article considers various ways of resolving Zeno’s Arrow Paradox. We show that it may be resolved through reinterpreting the term «now». Using the primitive entity «twinkling» based on actual time perception instead of the standard primitive temporal entity «instant» makes it possible to keep both all the premises and the structure of the paradox but avoid controversy.