METAPHYSICS OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND INFORMATIONAL REALISM: THE PROBLEM OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOUBLE-ASPECT PRINCIPLE OF INFORMATION
Alexandra Alexandrovna Tanyushina
Lomonosov Moscow State University, 27/4, Lomonosov av., Moscow, 119991, Russia
Keywords: phenomenal consciousness, "hard problem" of consciousness, double-aspect information principle, informational realism, epistemic structural realism, ontic structural realism
Abstract
The article considers the relationship between double-aspect theories of phenomenal consciousness, which have gained popularity today, and such a philosophical concept as informational realism. When interpreting mental experience in information and computing terms, many modern philosophers come to the conclusion that it is necessary to further develop metaphysical foundations of their theories by clarifying the ontological status of information structures. However, while the informational explanation of consciousness is combined with the concept of structural realism, it faces a number of complex conceptual problems relating primarily to the possibility of an anti-realist interpretation of information, as well as to the problem of finding the substantial basis of the underlying system of differences. Moreover, the question of the epistemological status of the concept of information still remains open and that also adds to the complexity of the conceptual analysis of the said theories. Despite this, there are certain prospects for the further development of both double-aspect theories of consciousness and an information-oriented terminology, which is a kind of link between modern natural sciences and philosophy.
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