Home – Home – Jornals – Philosophy of Sciences 2020 number 4

The article provides a philosophical and methodological study of the problem concerning the meaning of the idea of proof in scientific knowledge. Features of the development of the idea of scientific proof are described and explained; five stages of its development are marked out: naive, dualistic, normative, criterion-based and model ones. The explanation is produced why there are no absolute and a priori ideals of proof in science. A reference method for researching specific evidence is applied and a philosophical and methodological concept of a dynamic model of scientific evidence is put forward. A significant difference in the procedures of proof and justification is shown.

The main point of the article is that the Russellian analysis of the concept of existence does not provide a significant economy of ontology in comparison with the Meinongian one. The reason lies in the unavoidable need to preserve the possibility of numerical distinguishing between various nonexistent (unrealized) objects. For example, Sherlock Holmes is definitely not the same as the largest prime number. At the same time, in order to distinguish these two objects unrealized in the actual world, we need something which can be distinguished. It is this need for truthmakers for a vast class of true statements about nonexistent objects that prevents us from obtaining a more economical ontology. In particular, the refusal to treat these truth factors as objects in favor of treating them as unrealized combinations of properties only serves to revise their categorization (we transfer them from the individual level to the level of properties). However, such unrealized combinations of properties themselves can be considered as typical abstract objects, which nullifies all efforts to build a more economical ontology.

The article considers a scientific discussion developed in relation to the criticism of epistemological programs in modern sociology of science: relativism (H. Collins), constructivism (K. Knorr-Cetina, R. Krohn) and discourse analysis (M. Mulkay, G.N. Gilbert). The discussion between Th. Gieryn, H. Collins, M. Mulkay, G.N. Gilbert, K. Knorr-Cetina and R. Crohn organized in the form of reply articles in a scientific journal is presented. In responding to criticism, the authors focus not on certain studies, but on the key features of the program methodology, which makes it possible to analyze the specific character of modern programs of the sociology of science.

The article discusses the opposition of the normative function of the ideal of deductive proof and the diversity of the practice of mathematical research, which includes inactive elements. On the example of the analysis of the explanatory function of proof, it is shown that its implementation requires the conceptual content of the proof, which is not provided only by the deductive inference. The example of research in the field of foundations of mathematics shows that the implementation of the explanatory function is provided by the coexistence and interaction of inductive and deductive elements in mathematical research.

The article considers some possible correlations of two of the key concepts in the philosophy of science and contemporary epistemology - those of understanding and explanation. Special attention is paid to an attempt of a number of modern researchers to justify alternative ways to get understanding, which are not based on standard explanatory models. The most promising contexts for this kind of work are highlighted. The author gives proof of the advantages of this approach, especially when working with objects and processes influenced by a complex network of causal forces, as well as in practical problem-solving contexts where understanding is not propositional but is a matter of skill.

The work shows that modern philosophers underestimate the importance of the methodology of science. In particular, due to the analysis of requirements for the use of statistical methods, the following hypothesis was provided: the acceptance of the concept of holism has no ideological grounds, but is based on the impossibility of verifying the conditions for applying methods within contextual theories. In addition, contrary to Popper, the example of the method of testing statistical hypotheses shows that falsification and verification are not fundamentally different operations.

The article considers the relationship between double-aspect theories of phenomenal consciousness, which have gained popularity today, and such a philosophical concept as informational realism. When interpreting mental experience in information and computing terms, many modern philosophers come to the conclusion that it is necessary to further develop metaphysical foundations of their theories by clarifying the ontological status of information structures. However, while the informational explanation of consciousness is combined with the concept of structural realism, it faces a number of complex conceptual problems relating primarily to the possibility of an anti-realist interpretation of information, as well as to the problem of finding the substantial basis of the underlying system of differences. Moreover, the question of the epistemological status of the concept of information still remains open and that also adds to the complexity of the conceptual analysis of the said theories. Despite this, there are certain prospects for the further development of both double-aspect theories of consciousness and an information-oriented terminology, which is a kind of link between modern natural sciences and philosophy.

Elementary temporal experience is often presented as the «specious present» that combines the experience of the present and the recent past, as well as the content of this experience. J.D. Mabbott criticizes such an approach, because it involves a belief in discontinuity of the perception of time and hence discontinuity of consciousness. There are several temporal models of consciousness, within which attempts are made to explain the peculiarities of our temporal perception through the specious present. Among the most popular models is the one developed by F. Varela who proposes to use a «frame», which is most similar to a frame of visual perception, as the specious present. The article shows that F. Varela's concept is still not protected from criticism by J.D. Mabbot, but avoids it when the concept is used only as an explanation of particularities of perception.

The article states a thesis that at their core, all modern physical theories rest upon not only empirical bases, which are largely mediate, but also on metaphysical assumptions and hypotheses.