RUSSELLIAN ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF EXISTENCE: PROBLEMS AND DIFFICULTIES
Konstantin Gennadievich Frolov1,2
1St. Petersburg State Electrotechnical University, 5, Popova st., St. Petersburg, 197376, Russia
2Institute of Philosophy, St. Petersburg State University, 5, Mendeleev Line, St. Petersburg, 199034, Russia
Keywords: existence, object, paradox of non-existent objects, B. Russell, A. Meinong
Abstract
The main thesis of the article is that the idea of A. Meinong's interpretation of the concept of existence as an eccentric and deliberately implausible concept that implies absurd consequences is unjustified. The author shows that, being correctly presented, this approach not only does not contradict our typical and natural intuitions, but corresponds to them more than any other theory of a similar kind. In this, the key thesis of Meinongianism is that the subject matter of certain thoughts and ideas is not necessarily caused by the existence of the corresponding subject in the physical world. One can think about something that does not exist and such thinking will not be empty. At the same time, this thesis is not aimed at proving the “existence of something non-existent”, but just states a certain fact, which, although it needs further clarification, surely cannot be denied.
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