ELEMENTARY TEMPORAL EXPERIENCE: THE SPECIOUS PRESENT
Alina Sergeevna Zaykova
Institute of Philosophy and Law, SB RAS, 8, Nikolaev st. , Novosibirsk, 630090
Keywords: the specious present, perception of time, consciousness of time, F. Varela, temporal structures of consciousness, discontinuity of consciousness, continuity of consciousness
Abstract
Elementary temporal experience is often presented as the «specious present» that combines the experience of the present and the recent past, as well as the content of this experience. J.D. Mabbott criticizes such an approach, because it involves a belief in discontinuity of the perception of time and hence discontinuity of consciousness. There are several temporal models of consciousness, within which attempts are made to explain the peculiarities of our temporal perception through the specious present. Among the most popular models is the one developed by F. Varela who proposes to use a «frame», which is most similar to a frame of visual perception, as the specious present. The article shows that F. Varela's concept is still not protected from criticism by J.D. Mabbot, but avoids it when the concept is used only as an explanation of particularities of perception.
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