COULD NATURALISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY BE NORMATIVE?
Stepan Evgen'evich Ovchinnikov
Institute of Philosophy and Law, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 8, Nikolaev st., Novosibirsk, 630090, Russia
Keywords: натурализм, эпистемическая норма, априорная истинность, дескриптивное суждение, Naturalism, epistemic norm, a priori truth, descriptive judgment
Abstract
The article studies the problem of normativity in the framework of naturalized epistemology. The latter is compared with the traditional approach to epistemology, in which normativity is a consequence of the a priori truth of statements. Since there is no a priori truth in the naturalistic approach, it is either necessary to find another source of normativity, or reformulate the concept in an appropriate way. It is proposed to consider descriptive judgments as normative without resorting to additional sources of normativity. At the same time, the naturalistic fallacy can be avoided by considering the evolutionarily developed epistemic mechanisms of human.
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