Home – Home – Jornals – Philosophy of Sciences 2019 number 3

The article compares constituent components of the positions of Dutch philosopher Benedict Spinoza and Spanish priest Michel Molinos who published his work almost at the same time when of Spinoza's final treatise «Ethics» was cjmpleted. Comparison of their positions is very revealing. The fact is that Molinos is the creator of the concept of Quietism. This is a variant of religious understanding of the world, in which the focus is on the recognition of unconditional predestination by God of absolutely everything, including in human life. Hence the recommendation by Molinos to a believer of a position of complete indifference to everything that happens, including with this person himself. And Spinoza is one of those, moreover, the brightest European philosophers of the first century of the New Age, who are focused not on the religious, but on the then emerging scientific world outlook. But he is also committed to the idea of the unambiguously necessary character of the decisively all that takes place in the universe. And yet the position concerning the manifestations of human activity, Spinoza is diametrically opposed to that of Molinos. Since man, according to Spinoza, is a component of the universe, his own activity is one of the factors determining what is happening in the universe.

Using the example of the analysis of the perception of M. Heidegger's heritage by analytic philosophers, the article considers the problem relating to the interpretation of works of a representative of a certain type of rationality and philosophizing by bearers of another type of rationality and philosophizing. The author shows difficulties and complications of such interpretation. Also, he raises the translation problem associated with these difficulties. The conclusion is made that translation becomes not just a work consisting in translating from one natural language into another, but a special practice of conversion from one type of thinking to its another type.

The present text is a response to the article «The Return of Metaphysics As a Fact» recently published by O.E. Stolyarova (Problems of Philosophy, 2017, No. 8). In his wish to look at the nature of philosophical knowledge with the eyes of an analytic philosopher, the author of the present paper intends to formulate some crucial features of the project of analytical metaphysics. Among them, a drive for results, which is understood in a specific way, should be highlighted. With the help of certain examples, the paper discusses what kind of can be these results, by what means can we get them, and what are prospects of applying such methods. Thus, the attempt is made to defend the autonomy and the right to exist of the version of analytical metaphysics which develops with no reliance on a wide historical and philosophical context of the analyzed problems. At the same time, such a context is not denied, but is considered to be a subject of special studies. The author urges his colleagues to tolerate other's basic methodological and worldview principles, since a wide variety of approaches to problems of metaphysics just leads us to better understanding of this versatile subject and is not a threat at all.

The paper deals with the problem of self-reflection of formal systems. The traditional belief that unlike a human, a formal system / computer is not capable of self-reflection is analyzed through explication of the concept of self-reflection with regard to formal systems. It is shown that GL enables to use means of a formal system to express self-reflection of the system.

The author uses Cournot’s principle as an example to analyze the role of the principles connecting mathematics and reality. Cournot’s principle ensures verification of probabilities for the consequences of the tested hypothesis, using the hypothesis and data under study to deduce the consequences. If the values of these probabilities are less than a minimum permissible value, then the hypothesis is falsified. Therefore, the principle is important for hypothesis testing in mathematical statistics and Popper’s philosophy of science. The article demonstrates that Cournot's principle is not of probabilistic but rather probability-deterministic character.

The article presents a review of modern theories which postulate the existence of quantum processes and their influence on the structure of the brain and consciousness (Penrose's, Fisher's and Tegmark's theories). The main premise of these theories consists in the interpretation of the brain as a quantum computer, so the article considers in detail the analogy of the brain both with a classical and a quantum computer. It is shown that by now these theories have practically no evidence. Thus, discussions about the degree of influence of quantum processes on consciousness still continue in modern science. It should be noted that quantum biology modern data show that in general quantum processes can influence the functioning of motor and cognitive processes in animals and humans.

The article raises and considers the problem of the completeness of philosophical conceptions in the formation and development of classical physics.

The article deals with the problem of the uncertainty of interpretation in communication and the theory of knowledge. We understand interpretation as following a semantic rule of semiosis (i.e. reference, the relationship between the sense and meaning of a sign as a method of specifying an object by symbolic means and an object itself, procedures of designation, denotation, etc.). We understand uncertainty as a situation of misunderstanding in the hermeneutical sense, as a situation of knowledge about ignorance in the epistemic sense, and as a situation of expression in the sense of the activity theory and philosophy of technology. Our research method is semiotic modeling. The article considers the communicative semiosis in the literary theory in relation to the emergence and development of the problem of uncertainty in receptive aesthetics and the semiosis of the cognition process in the receptive and projective directions in relation to the act of inventive technical activity. The thesis brought forward for discussion is that the use of indexical, iconic and symbolic grounds for eliminating uncertainty is appreciably different in the receptive semiosis and projective one (for communicative positions of the speaker and the hearer) and involves referring to non-commutative (epistemic) forms of semiosis. The activity theory, when represented, e.g., by philosophy and semiotics of technology, demonstrates a method of complete elimination of the uncertainty of interpretation, against the background of which models of objects of the limited certainty can be built. The hypothesis is formulated that the executed technical object completely eliminates the uncertainty of interpretation in projective activity, complying with M. Mersenne's requirement concerning understanding; the uncertainty of the communicative process cannot be eliminated and calls for studying the descriptive and prescriptive use of indices, icons and symbols for designating hypotheses, representations and objects.

The article analyzes publications on the new scientific and technical revolution (STR). Views untrue to the process of the new STR are criticized. The author substantiates the concept of NTR in XX-XXI centuries as a single and consistent process which goes on according to strict regularities.

The article criticizes the position of E. Morris set forth in his recent book, The Ashtray , in which, referring to the episode of his studies with T. Kuhn, he strongly criticized the so-called relativism. It is shown that Morris, when unreasonably relying on S. Kripke's logical metaphysics, which is irrelevant to relativism, misses essential details related to R. Rorty's relativism.