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V.L. Tambovtsev, I.A. Rozhdestvenskaya

ADMINISTRATIVE EVALUATION OF REGIONAL AUTHORITIES: ECONOMIC THEORY AND RUSSIA'S EXPERIENCE

The paper analyses the existing Russian systems for the evaluation of regional governments and agencies judging from their compliance with the propositions of economic contract theory. We introduce a notion of administrative evaluation, describe possible goals and consequences of using administrative evaluations in governance processes. Based on the contract theory propositions, we characterize the requirements that, if not followed, may enable administrative evaluation to exert a negative influence on system effectiveness and efficiency. Such negative consequences did take place in other countries that initiated the administrative evaluation system in practices of public administration before Russia. The article defines a list of indicators for administrative evaluation elaborated in accordance with regulatory documents and

determine ways to implement them in governance processes. We demonstrate that these indicators contradict the contract theory propositions and thus cannot give an adequate estimation of regional authorities' performance that might help to enhance it. Our findings can be used to improve methodological support for administrative evaluation carried out in Russian regions.

Keywords: administrative evaluation; region; economic contract theory

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