

Раздел III ФИЛОСОФИЯ ОБРАЗОВАНИЯ В ЗАПАДНОЙ ТРАДИЦИИ

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ОБЯЗАННОСТИ И ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЕ ОБРАЗОВАНИЕ ПО ЦИЦЕРОНУ

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Цицерон диагностирует потребность однородного образования, которое политически повлияет на молодые поколения. Поскольку данный вопрос прежде всего затрагивает органичность отношений между участниками, из которых состоит государство, устанавливается, что имеется определенная моральная связь, которая развивается между гегемоном или главенствующей группой, которая реализует власть, и гражданами. Несколько аспектов обязанностей лежат в пределах контекста социальной динамики морального действия. В этой связи Цицерон рассуждает о различии «полезного» и «честного» («honestum»), то есть целесообразного и правильного, что связано с политическим образованием. Согласно этому рассуждению, данные две категории в конечном счете тавтологичны, поэтому предотвращают любую политическую вовлеченность, которая бросила бы вызов их общему и непоколебимому признанию. Наш римский оратор очень близок к стоической догме, когда уточняет собственный концептуальный подход к политической «благопристойности». Власть, данная государством и людьми, служит бесспорным свидетелем принципов, которые должны стать очевидными в каждом проявлении этой власти. Взаимное управление политической властью и разделённая ответственность этих двух частей ведут к концепции государства, которое не только соблюдает «officia» (долг, этикет), но также понимает, что на практике правильное действие по-прежнему зависит от обычаев, закона и обучения.

Ключевые слова: политическое образование, обязанности, Цицерон, добродетель, нравственно правильное, целесообразное, гегемон, власть, закон.

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DUTIES AND THE POLITICAL EDUCATION IN CICERO

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Cicero diagnoses the necessity of a uniform education that will politically affect the younger generations. As the issue is primarily concerned with the organicity between the members that consist the State, it is ascertained that there is a specific moral bond which is developed between the hegemon, or the hegemonic group, that exerts power and the citizens. Several aspects of duties lie within the context of the social dynamics of moral action. In this frame, Cicero proceeds with the distinction of the "utile" and the "honestum", i.e. the expedient and the right, which are connected with political education. According to this theorization, the two are eventually tautological, therefore averting any political involvement that would defy their common and unswerving acknowledgement. The Roman orator follows closely the stoic dogma while elaborating on his own conceptual approach of the political "decorum". The power given by the State and the people serves as the undeniable witness of the principles that have to become apparent in every expression of it. The mutual management of the political power and the shared responsibility of the two parts guides to the conception of a State that abides by the "officia" but also realizes that practically the right action continues to be a matter contingent on customs, law and training.

Key words: *political education, duties, Cicero, virtue, morally right, expedient, hegemon, power, law.*

In the third book of *De Legibus* (29-30), Cicero upholds that education is indispensable for State officials (cf. Griffin 1989, 1-37). The orientation of the discussion is set on the future generations, as it is claimed that they are in need of a particular training and education (*educatio et disciplina*) which will deter them from dishonour when in public offices. As a State official, being a great and noble man (*vir magnus*), acts in certain ways, he serves as a model for the rest of the citizens (*moderator rei publicae*). This role is so important that a statesman should focus on the duty of improving and examining himself continually, reflecting these changes in his life and character, and urge others to imitate him (*De Re Publica*, II. xlii. 69). The Roman orator remarks that "as the whole State is habitually corrupted by the evil desires and the vices of its prominent men, so it is improved and reformed by self restraint on their part" (*De Legibus*, III. xiii. 30). In *De Re Publica* (IV. iii. 3), he elucidates further that a system of education fixed by law and officially established is essential for the upbringing of the youth while in *De Officiis* he transfers the matter of political education to the actions of the ruler and the ruled in a context of self governance and wisdom.

For Cicero, the moral dimension of governing and of being governed consists in: a) the common human element between contributing parts i.e. citizens and leadership, b) the teleological dimension of governance which is based on the outcome that the State produces and which has to be *eudaimonia*, c) the pervasive influence of justice in private as well as in public issues where justice is not an abstract concept but a political virtue with practical influence on

everyday life. According to the Roman orator, the notion of the State regards the usage of common goods, sources and abilities in order to strengthen the natural bond which naturally exists between all human beings (*De Officiis*, I. vii. 22). This bond is not grounded on common benefits as they are; it is not grounded on their extrinsic value as goods, but on the perception of mutual assistance and co-integration into the social corpus (*De Officiis*, II. iv. 13-15. Cf. Bodson 1967). The common bond of human beings, that Cicero diagnoses, is originated in the homologation of the common usage of “ratio” and “oratio”, which is reason and speech (*De Officiis*, I. xvi. 50 and *De Legibus*, I). Taking constantly into consideration the stoic view of human commitment to a common end which is dictated by Nature and Logos and which is materialized through virtue, Cicero develops a political and moral theory which consolidates these human bonds by means of explicit principles and which aims at the development of the self.

The Roman statesman affirms that philosophy cannot be conceived without a theory of duties. That's why political theory and practice must be grounded mainly on the stable acceptance of duties. It is quite clear that it's about an ethical understanding of the State by rulers and by those who are ruled: if anyone considers something to be good, but not connected with any moral prerequisite, which would indicate a “duty”, while he simultaneously connects it with his own interests, he cannot be able to understand friendship, justice or generosity, all indispensable virtues for the sustainability of the State, unless he naturally has the tendency to those qualities. This remark reveals the subsequent need for a concrete definition of what is Good for the State, of the moral measure, and the admission of the necessity of education (*De Officiis*, I. ii. 5), an education based on modesty (*De Re Publica*, IV. vi. 6). It is deduced that every argument about duties has two basic parameters: a) the definition of good and b) the practical rules, which issues of every day life can be regulated upon (*De Officiis*, I. iii. 7). Cicero distinguishes, in continuation, two kinds of duties: a) the “officium perfectum” (the full, absolute duty) and b) the “officium medium” (the average duty). The first one is characterized by the quality of self-worth, while the latter is a duty, for which there is a sufficient reason (ratio probabilis) (*De Officiis*, I. iii. 8).

The morally right (honestum) in reference to the State occurs through one of the following four sources: a) the full understanding and intellectual development of the real, b) the maintenance of the organized society due to each citizen's proportional contribution and the faithful performance of his duties and obligations, c) the importance and power of a noble and invincible spirit and d) the order and moderation of everything that is said or done (*De Officiis*, I. v. 15 and xxix. 102-xxx. 107). However, the morally right is not unchangeable. Indeed, it can be prioritized or even altered. Depending on the circumstances, the moral duty is subject to change, but most importantly it is varied depending on the bond we have with our fellow human beings (*De Officiis*, I. xviii. 59). This aspect directs to the perception of a non absolute moral good and here, of course, a question arises: does Cicero's argument lead to scepticism as far as the moral action is concerned? The answer is that for Cicero as well as for the Stoics whose ethical theory he generally acclaims, a lot of matters are left to the moral criterion of the person who performs the deed. Cicero does not

recommend a type of scientific morality with steady principles and guidelines but he trusts morality to inner reason, that springs out of Nature, even in matters of the State, therefore even in moral matters that arise in relation between hegemony and citizens.

The important question in this pattern of thought is if what is expedient (utile) is always the same with what is morally right (honestum). The Roman theorist has adopted the stoic conviction that there is only one and only Good. In his view, the potential question about which good can be better than the other is ostensible and untenable (*De Officiis*, II. iii. 10 and III. xxx. 110). Those who distinguish between the two, he affirms, are mobilized by mercenary motives and are rendered tyrants in a democracy; therefore they turn out to be its intruders. Moreover, he alleges that such people are capable of any kind of deceit and moral crime (*De Officiis*, III. viii. 36). What is morally right is dictated by the natural law, the one expressed in right reason and only this natural law can be identified predicatively with human law. In fact, the Roman consul concludes that no dissociation between legality and morality can exist, and neither of them can be disconnected from expediency. Every opposite opinion that differentiates the principles of legality and morality, according to Cicero, is mere sophistry and abolishes the nucleus and the targeting of democracy. In accordance with Cicero's political theory of duties, the personal or friendly relationships should not intervene in the political work, as it is not allowed that the best interests of the State are affected so that the ruler can defend his personal options in any official level (*De Officiis*, III. x. 43).

Specifically, public service needs to be free from any vulnerability: first, the ruler must always bear in mind the good of the citizens in such high degree that his conscience would allow him to act against his own interest during his public office. A very important parameter, according to the Roman thinker, is that the private interest of the politician must be sacrificed for the sake of the common benefit, when necessary. Even in the case that the ruler has to sacrifice his honour or his reputation, the conservation of the stability of the State and the prosperity of the citizens come first. At this point, the element of self-sacrifice versus public interest is introduced and this self-sacrifice is the price that the politician has to pay for the power that he has gathered. Secondly, he shouldn't discriminate in favour of one or another social group; otherwise this would trigger division and struggle between those groups. An immediate result of his possible partiality would be that part of the people would support one party or fraction, while others would support another and very few, says Cicero, would support the nation as a whole. The loss of the organismic connection between citizens and the State would thus be catastrophic. Consequently, the wise politician must pursue the public interest in its entirety and he must exhibit maximum wisdom by not discriminating the interests of the citizens but by unifying them with impartial judgement and justice. This is the highest political virtue as well as the highest service to the State. Third, the political procedure needs to be conducted in a spirit of nobility and tolerance, even during the electoral process, without any hostile behaviour towards the opponent parts (*De Officiis*, I. xxv. 85-89).

In accordance with the above, Cicero clarifies that the prevalence of moderation and order in the every day life of the citizens not only strengthens

moral correctness but also saves the moral dignity of the ones who are involved in the activities of the State. In this frame, it is required that justice and benevolence prevail for all. Justice means not to harm one another unless this is caused by some injury. Furthermore, justice conducts citizens to use common goods for common purposes and private goods for private purposes. Indeed, as far as the ruler and the citizen are concerned, Cicero insists that the one who does not prevent or oppose to an injustice is an accomplice to the offender (*De Officiis*, I. vii. 23). In addition, he remarks that the one who is pushed to injustice, does this because of some private interest, therefore, greed is the reason that urges to the disruption of the political and ethical order (*De Officiis*, I. vii. 24). Another reason that urges to the commitment of unjust actions is the unrestrained desire (cupiditas) and mostly the one that is turned towards the acquisition of power and influence. Desire of this type, clarifies the Roman jurist, leads with accuracy to the accumulation of excessive wealth with unjust means (*De Officiis*, I. viii. 25) and to the loss of the essential freedom that the moral agent should be able to enjoy (*De Officiis*, I. xx. 68). The grandeur and vehemence of one's spirit many times conduct to the lust for power and authority and such a person is not easily limited by reason or by law. Due to that and to the fallacies imposed by greed and ambition (*De Officiis*, I. xix. 64-65), people with special abilities seek for uncontrolled power and glory without taking into account the moral good that is dictated by nature. It becomes apparent that justice constitutes the specific difference as regards moral correctness (honestum); for example, the courage displayed during the commission of an unjust act is not praised but it is reprehensible; equally, knowledge that does not include justice is mere malice and not wisdom, etc. According to this reasoning, we conclude with the final definition of the just: it is something that seeks for the truth and the good with bravery and high spirit (*De Officiis*, I. xix. 62-63).

For Cicero, the sage, who is the model for the statesman, has no fear, desire or tendency to pleasures. He is characterized by a reasonable and unwavering stability of character and, also, by dignity (*De Officiis*, I. xx. 69). Great emphasis is given in the avoidance of arrogance and pride. In this manner one is able to cultivate a stable and calm personality, with the ability to govern himself and control the passions, before he attempts to govern anyone else, much more the State (*De Officiis*, I. xxvi. 90). What are, therefore, the key features of such an outstanding personality which is capable of achieving resistance to ambition and greed, vices created by wealth and power? This kind of personality is regulated by two fundamental parameters: a) indifference to the external conditions (apathy). Such a man is convinced that only Good is worth and that, therefore, he mustn't depend his life on people's opinions or on passions, b) the certainty that life should be devoted to industrious and useful actions through the full exploitation of one's capabilities for the benefit of the whole (*De Officiis*, I. xx. 66). The starting point for the development of a citizen until the point that he offers his services as a politician, must be the irreproachable character, his sense of justice, being able to sustain himself with own means during his service. The wealth inherited by one's family or the hereditary electoral clientele are indications of an inappropriate climbing to positions of power (*De Officiis*, II. xx. 69). Only the competent and adequate person is recognized by Cicero in the distribution of political power.

Under this prism, it is concluded that nobody should live a life of seclusion, fully focused on the theoretical quest of the truth (as the political action, for Cicero, is the essence of life and the culmination of the virtuous living), because this falls under the category of passive offense, that means that one, by not preventing or not opposing to the unjust, actually permits it. Indeed, even knowledge or wisdom itself may be rendered inactive, sterile and ineffective, if they are not in the service of the society and the law. So the sage should voluntarily play an active role in politics and in society, since an action inherently right is just only if it has its own will (*si est voluntarium*) (*De Officiis*, I. ix. 28). Cicero notes that the man who does not make efforts of such a nature and does not work for the benefit of the society literally betrays social life (*De Officiis*, I. ix. 29). The competent man, the outstanding citizen, has the obligation to serve the State. The State, on the other hand, has the obligation to demand his services constantly for its own benefit (*De Officiis*, I. xxi. 71. Cf. S.V.F. III. 332: мъпнп гпжн фън упщън п1 цйльупщпй вбуйлЭб, нпмпнпЭфзн, уфсбфзгън, ... кзсэф-фпхуйн). The responsibility of those who have the means to contribute to society is obvious since no such man should be concentrated on his own personal matters (cf. Trapp 2007, 134-143). Bravery and the determination of a strong spirit are included in the features of the ruler, so that in hard times he does not get disorganized, he does not deviate from the path of right reason (*De Officiis*, I. xxiii. 80), and does not let his reason give in to emotion or impulse (*De Officiis*, I. xxxix. 141).

The hegemon's mental capacity must be so powerful that he will be able to predict what will happen in the future, able to plan and take action in relation with any possibility. His perspicacity should include the careful selection of advisors and friends, so as to avoid succumbing to flattery (*De Re Publica*, IV. vii. 7) or to the addiction of critical errors (*De Officiis*, I. xxvi. 91). The acumen of this political man must strictly be followed by the ability to distinguish among things. A good deed that takes place without distinction and without appropriate judgments eventually turns out bad and does not promote the public interest. This means that the ruler should not merely apply a common measure for anything that seems similar with another but he should see the matter with profundity and readjust his strategies whenever it is necessary (*De Officiis*, I. xxxi. 112-113). The political man should primarily be characterized by moderation and self-control, he must choose what the Romans name "decorum" and the Greeks "ρεσπν" (cf. Adomeit 1999). The "ρεσπн" or "decorum" is not separable from the morally right (*honestum*) (*De Officiis*, I. xxvii. 93), because the "ρεσпн", the one that befits each condition, is, in this case, the morally right (*De Officiis*, I. xxvii. 94. Cf. Arnold 1911, 313-314). The purpose of this confrontation with the problem is the proper and orderly function of justice, in order not to penalize any fellow citizen and not to hurt the dignity and the public sentiment of the citizens. The popularity of the politician (*De Officiis*, II. xi. 38) is secured by the exercise of justice and the rational practice of governance; therefore, popularity is not necessarily sought by other means, especially by demagogy. The distortion and the loss of truth are not only inappropriate and morally incorrect, but also consist heavy illnesses of the State and of the politician.

All in all, Cicero in *De Re Publica* (III. iii. 5-6) suggests there are two ways of political knowledge: acquiring learning and observing ancestral customs, which have been made by men of wisdom. Still nothing is superior to putting things into practice; otherwise what remains from that knowledge is only theory, not experience. Political education should reflect the values of the State but in a practical and efficient manner. In this context, the virtues of the politician are moderation, stability, self-control, to take into consideration the welfare of the citizens, having fully accepted his institutional role. It is deduced that there must be special care for those in need (*De Officiis*, I. xxviii. 98). Moreover, the public fortune should not be wasted in affairs which are inessential or without sufficient reason (*De Officiis*, II. xviii. 62). The politician does not have the right to make wrong use of the public money and funds. Cicero makes explicit that the exploitation of the State for personal benefit is not only unethical, but also criminous (*De Officiis*, I. xxii. 77). This, in turn, implies that indifference to the public feeling is not only a clear sign of arrogance, but also an exhibition of real lack of principles (*De Officiis*, I. xxviii. 99).

Conclusively, it should be noted that despite the conviction of the Roman thinker, in *De Legibus*, that statesmen can serve as models for the citizens, he recognizes that, through the observation of the behaviour or of the reactions of others or by accepting the criticism of people better than one, a person can be able to correct the morally wrong in his own behaviour (*De Officiis*, I. xli. 146-147), something that is probably not a matter of evaluation but a matter that expresses non-systematic, rather than solidified, attitudes. The interaction with society is the safeguard of the political culture and the social body is the mirror of the politician. This valuable element that Cicero gives has also this meaning: if society supports wrong values or promotes incorrect goods, this means that the politician, reflecting himself in it, only sees a distorted reflection of the law of morality or justice. In consequence, the social responsibility, the collective political responsibility of the citizens, has an indissoluble bond with the political act of the ruler or the hegemonic caste.

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