"SENSIBLE RELATIVISM", VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND CONTEXTUAL REALISM
Igor Evgenievich Pris
Institute of Philosophy, National Academy of Sciences, Belarus, 1, bd. 2, Surganova st., Minsk, 220072, Belarus
Keywords: реализм, релятивизм, контекстуальный реализм, разумный релятивизм, эпистемический релятивизм, эпистемология добродетелей, станс, перспектива, абсолютизм, realism, relativism, contextual realism, sensible relativism, epistemic relativism, virtue epistemology, stance, perspective, absolutism
Abstract
We assert that M. Kush's «sensitive relativism» may be «favorably» interpreted or modified as contextual realism. We also conclude that neither absolutism nor relativism is an unequivocally epistemically virtuous or vicious position («stance»). Genuine epistemic virtues, namely tolerance, open mind, intellectual humility, courage and autonomy, curiosity, the pursuit of truth and knowledge, and others, are inherent in Wittgenstein's non-metaphysical (contextual) realistic position. Unlike realism, relativism, as well as dogmatism and absolutism, lacks a genuine commitment. The persistence of relativism is not due to the fact that it is a stance, but due to its critical attitude to absolutism and dogmatism. The ambiguous analysis of the epistemic merits and vices of relativism carried out by M. Baghramyan and M. Kush is because they lacked the analysis of the concept of reality.
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