Home – Home – Jornals – Philosophy of Sciences 2018 number 3

The article compares positions of Spinoza and Hobbes regarding the issues which they solve in a partly similar or even coincident way, as well as differently, often to a great extent. Such a comparison made it possible to clarify important components of the doctrines of both philosophers. First of all, we reveal that Hobbes, who declared his adherence to empiricism, actually recognized the independent role of the human mind in the creation of mathematics and mechanics. We note that Spinoza and Hobbes were in a real solidarity with each other when rejecting churchmen’s scholastic verbalism and typical human ideas of God and biblical spirits. At the same time, we show that in his non-recognition of the divine nature of the human language, Spinoza is more consistent than Hobbes. Taking into account a mechanistic nature of the scientific picture of the world emerging in the 17th century, we reveal a specific character of both philosophers’ viewpoints concerning the issues of recognition of empty space, classification of causes and relationship of human freedom and necessity.

The article studies the validity of H. Field’s assumption of the possibility of confusing two different conceptions of truth, a correspondent conception and a disquotational one, in the concept of truth as it is used in the natural language. It is shown that both philosophical conceptions are not sufficiently developed to represent Field’s assumption as a well-developed theory. We ascertain that Field’s assumption faces the problem of explaining the possibility of disquotational truth to increase a theoretical-evidential value of the theory in mathematics.

The article compares the positions of T. Kuhn and R. Rorty regarding the concept of the progress in science and its norms. It is shown that the concept of changing the «vocabulary» as an analog of the paradigm requires a specific doctrine of «redescription». The author demonstrates that despite Rorty’s adherence to Kuhn’s theory of the structure of a scientific revolution, he has to remain largely adherent to the traditional concept of the progress in science.

In logic, a scientific theory is traditionally represented as a deductive closure of primitive sentences of the theory. In this, a set of terms of the theory is divided into a theoretical part and an empirical one. In that regard, the question arises concerning the role of theoretical terms in the resulting deductive system, and it is usually solved by means of methods for eliminating the theoretical part in order to isolate empirical consequences of the theory. It is shown that the method for constructing a deductively equivalent system for the theoretical part proposed by F.P. Ramsey not only describes an empirical significance of theoretical terms for the original theory, but also explains the role of a theorist in the development of scientific knowledge.

The article considers complications of the IF logic apparatus caused by the need to eliminate its counterintuitive consequences. It is shown that this leads to complication of the IF logic conceptual apparatus which contradicts its original goals. In particular, we consider the need to distinguish two types of skolemization, as well as the interpretation of propositional connectives leading to modification of the concept of branching quantifiers in IF logic.

The article shows that the formalization method is not universal. First, mathematization gives no way to answer a number of questions, for example those related to the essence of knowledge. Second, mathematics is quite valid for representing knowledge in the field of exact science, but it is less adequate for humanities. Third, not all mathematical disciplines are used in applications; it is rather the task of applied mathematics. Fourth, even in applied mathematics, not all its fields have a universal application.

The article shows that the concept of «life» is fundamental not only for biology, but also for physics. We consider scientists’ attempts to define this concept through more general scientific categories than categories of biology. Such categories include information and entropy which help to treat life as an objectively existing structure. The article classifies fundamental physical features inherent in the concept of «life».

Is justified by the views of the author, according to which explicitly philosophy plays a role in physics during the crisis of the old and the formation of a new physical picture of the world.

The paper attempts to distinguish a speculative-metaphysical content of quantum theories of mind and a specific scientific one. The conclusion is made that the hypothesis of the quantum-mechanical nature of abnormal psychological phenomena cannot be verified empirically because of their non-reproducibility in laboratory conditions. We give arguments for a methodological approach which asserts that if the hypothesis of the quantum nature of the brain elemental base is correct, then traces of quantum phenomena can be found in everyday and laboratory-reproducible mental states, viz bistable perception, distribution of answers, distribution of associative tests results, and memory. An approach is proposed within which the analysis of behavior, propositions and making decisions by a person carried out with the help of the probability-theoretic apparatus of quantum mechanics gives reasons for interpreting brain states as quantum macro-phenomena of quantum computing states. We propose perspective approaches for verifying hypotheses of the quantum-mechanical nature of psyche: 1) simulation of cognitive functions with quantum neurocomputers; 2) application of invasive neurodetectors for detecting tunnel effects and quantum correlation phenomena in neurons.

The article postulates the existence of the “evidentialist” and “actualist” conceptions of belief in epistemology, which originate from classical philosophy. There is a move from a primitive, non-analyzed concept of belief to a concept which allows an epistemologist to consider belief not only from his or her own perspective, but also from perspectives of a philosopher of language and a philosopher of mind. Such an approach enriches and deepens epistemological consequences that an epistemologist receives. Тhis move is considered in the context of the “pragmatization” trend, which is a general property of modern philosophy.

The paper provides a review of the collection of scientific works «Williamson on Modality» and contains a brief summary of the main ideas of the articles published in the book.