SEMANTIC VOID OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY OF SCIENCE
A.S. Zaykova
Institute of Philosophy and Law, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Novosibirsk, Russia
Keywords: artificial intelligence, social epistemology, Large Language Models, scientific communication, epistemic trust, testimony, truth, semantic gap, semantic void
Abstract
The article examines the phenomenon of the semantic void in large language models through the lens of the social epistemology of science. It is demonstrated that the inability of artificial intelligence to achieve genuine understanding poses fundamental risks to epistemic trust and communication within the scientific community. Drawing on the concepts of epistemic dependence and the theory of testimony, it is shown that the integration of non-intentional systems into the knowledge production process renders legitimate epistemic trust impossible, since a machine is incapable of bearing responsibility for the truth of its statements.
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