EPISTEMIC DILEMMAS AND NORMATIVE CONFLICTS
A.A. Shevchenko
Institute of Philosophy and Law, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Novosibirsk, Russia
Keywords: epistemic dilemmas, normative residue, ought implies can, factive and non-factive norms, higher-order evidence, Ockham’s razor, non- ideal rationality
Abstract
The paper examines the nature of epistemic dilemmas - situations in which any available doxastic attitude toward a proposition inevitably violates at least one epistemic norm. The author identifies three types of such dilemmas: inter-normative, hierarchical, and implicit. It is shown that acknowledging epistemic dilemmas does not lead to normative nihilism, but requires a revision of the “ought implies can” principle and the standard deontic logic. A shift from an ideal to a non-ideal model of epistemic rationality is proposed, in which normative indeterminacy and normative residue (an unfulfilled obligation) are recognized as normal features of the normative situation an epistemic subject may face.
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