COMPETITION IN THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT SYSTEM: INSTITUTIONAL AND PRICE DISTORTIONS
Evgeniy A. Varnavskiy
Novosibirsk State University of Economics and Management, Novosibirsk, Russian Federation
Keywords: public procurement, competition, cartel, soft price-fixing, antitrust control, IMCP
Abstract
The article examines institutional and price distortions of competition in the system of public procurement of the Russian Federation. Based on a comparative analysis of domestic scholarly approaches to the study of competitive processes within the contract system, key factors contributing to the decline in competition are identified. Using data from the Unified Information System and official statistics for the period 2020-2025, it is established that anti-competitive activity has shifted from aggressive price dumping toward “soft collusion”, aimed at maximizing margins while maintaining minimal formal price reductions that preserve the appearance of competitive bidding. A set of measures is proposed, including the introduction of automated “soft collusion” indicators at the procurement planning stage to eliminate structural barriers.
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