Home – Home – Jornals – Philosophy of Sciences 2025 number S5

In the first part of the article, I showed that an interfering factor for the development of science and philosophy of science is the lack of consensus in the philosophical community about the philosophical status of the methodology of science, and, as a consequence, inadequate attention to research in this discipline. I have considered two well-known sets of arguments against the methodology of science. The first group is based on the recognition by the philosophical community of the relativistic nature of physical knowledge after the discoveries of the theory of relativity and quantum physics. The second group of arguments is based on the attitude of the classics of the philosophy of science towards science. Thus, P. Feyerabend denied the universal nature of scientific methods, and T. Kuhn often denied the objective development of science. I have formulated the following counterarguments. First, despite a certain relativism in contemporary science, philosophers’ аbstrаction from scientific achievements leads to a decline in the quality of research in the philosophy of science. Secondly, in his autobiography, Feyerabend acknowledged the ironic nature of his famous argument for scientific relativism. In the second part of the article, I described certain prospects for the participation of philosophers with knowledge of specialized sciences in scientific activity, mainly as critics of the imperfections of science and the incorrect use of philosophical ideas by scientists. However, there are certain prospects for the participation of the philosophical community in projects of a non-critical nature, for example, the construction of new criteria of explanation and understanding for the natural sciences and formal disciplines.