ON THE COMMENSURABILITY OF THE QUESTIONS “CAN A MACHINE THINK?” AND “CAN A MACHINE WIN THE IMITATION GAME?”
Alina Sergeevna Zaykova
Philosophy and Law, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Novosibirsk, Russia
Keywords: commensurability, Turing Test, machine thinking, consciousness, imitation game, philosophy of AI, epistemology, behavioral criterion
Abstract
This paper offers a critical analysis of the commensurability between two foundational questions in the philosophy of artificial intelligence: “Can a machine think?” and “Can a machine win the imitation game?” It is argued that, despite Alan Turing’s pragmatic substitution proposed in 1950, these questions differ in ontological status and conceptual framework. Drawing on the works of D. Dennett, J. Searle, D. Chalmers, and others, the paper demonstrates that commensurability is possible only in an epistemologically limited, inductive sense-but not in a logical or ontological one. The study emphasizes the necessity of distinguishing behavioral simulation from genuine thinking, thereby avoiding the category mistake often associated with interpreting the Turing Test as proof of machine consciousness.
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