DEFLATIONISM IN METAMETAPHYSICS DOES NOT LEAD TO METAPHYSICAL ANTIREALISM
Georgii Vladislavovich Cherkasov
Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia
Keywords: ontological antirealism, deflationism, quantifier variance, metaphysical antirealism, skepticism about metaphysics, relativism, metaontology, metametaphysics
Abstract
The article focuses primarily on outlining the positions of critics of heavyweight ontology - deflationists and antirealists. The author shows that these positions do not entail the denial of metaphysics. The article begins with examples from the Russian-language discussion in which deflationism and antirealism in metaontology are associated with the denial of the existence of an independent reality - metaphysical antirealism. These examples fall within the general trend of confusing theses of scientific, metaphysical, and epistemological antirealism, as well as antirealism with respect to specific types of entities (sometimes relativism and skepticism are also included). Next, a terminological policy is proposed for distinguishing between ontology and metaphysics, as well as metaontology and metametaphysics. It is argued that these terms usually play a coordinating role in the discussion and do not require definition. At the same time, clarifying the coordination terms helps advance from debates about words to debates about substantive issues.,
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