PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF E. HUSSERL’S HISTORY OF SCIENCE
Nadezhda Vasilyevna Bryanik
First President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin Ural Federal University, Ekaterinburg, Russia
Keywords: E. Husserl, philosophy of science, history of science, beginning/origins, meaning, language, scientific tradition, “universal a priori of history”, crisis of science, scientific rationality
Abstract
In the postpositivist philosophy of science, with all the variety of directions, the dominant tendency - the turn of the philosophy of science to the history of science - is quite generally recognized. Postpositivist interpretations of the history of science (T. Kuhn, I. Lakatos, K. Popper, etc.) are created in explicit or implicit polemics with the positivist concept of evolution; and thus remain within the conceptual boundaries of this paradigm. In this regard, those versions of the history of science that go beyond this paradigm are of interest. They include E. Husserl’s concept, in which the history of science is viewed through the prism of the genesis of deductive sciences (geometry and mathematical physics) - from the emergence of the original sense to the formation of a scientific tradition in these theoretical sciences, which for each given generation of scientists acts as a “universal a priori of history”. The emergence of mathematical physics in the New Age is evaluated by him as a break with the previous scientific tradition, which means a crisis in science, which is accompanied by the crisis of European humanity as a whole. Based on E. Husserl’s works on the history of science, the article reconstructs a system of basic concepts that recreates a phenomenological version of the history of science.
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