TRANSLATEOF «LISA BENOSSI & SVEN BERNECKER. A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE ON ROBOT ETHICS»
Alina Sergeevna Zaykova
Institute of Philosophy and Law of Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Novosibirsk, Russia
Keywords: robot ethics, agency, Kantian viewpoint, neutral viewpoint, moral agent, robots
Abstract
What conditions does a robot have to satisfy to qualify as a moral agent? Should robots become moral agents, or should humanity fully retain agency and personhood for itself? Is it permissible to prevent robots from developing moral agency? This paper examines these questions from a viewpoint-neutral and a Kantian perspective. Regarding the first question, we argue that the Kantian standards for moral agency could not possibly be met by robots. The second and third questions are more difficult to answer, in part because the viewpoint-neutral perspective does not provide a clear verdict. We argue that it is a feature of the Kantian perspective to propose a plausible answer. The idea is that preventing robots from achieving moral personality is morally permissible, insofar as our intention is consistent with the respect of human life and its rational nature.
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