EPISTEMIC AKRASIA AND RATIONALITY
Aleksandr Anatolyevich Shevchenko
Institute of Philosophy and Law, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 8, Nikolaev st., Novosibirsk, 630090, Russia
Keywords: akrasia, rationality, epistemic attitudes, volitional control, "Moore's paradox", "ought implies can"
Abstract
By analogy with practical akrasia, epistemic akrasia is considered from two perspectives - its fundamental possibility and its rationality. Although this phenomenon is well known, it is not easy to explain it, since it seems to be a clear indication of irrationality. The conditions for the possibility of epistemic akrasia include some form of control over our opinions and beliefs, as well as awareness of choice. Its rationalization requires weakening the tenets of rationality - from strict logical consistency towards pragmatism. Further rationalization of such cases is possible with an appropriate interpretation of the “ought implies can” formula, which would limit and weaken our epistemic obligations.
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