RICHARD RORTY'S CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT OF ANALYSIS
Oksana Ivanovna Tselishcheva
Institute of Philosophy and Law, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 8, Nikolaev st., Novosibirsk, 630090 Russia
Keywords: concept of analysis, Rorty, analytical philosophy, linguistic philosophy, Kripke, essentialism
Abstract
The article argues that according to R. Rorty, the main drawback of the central concept of analytical philosophy - the analysis of meaning-is the lack of continuity of schools and generations. Rorty traces the intermittent development of the analytical movement from G. Frege and B. Russell to the Oxford School of Ordinary language, and then to W. Quine and S. Kripke. The synopsis of the change in the concepts of analysis is presented for Rorty by S. Soames’ final description of the history of analytical philosophy as a change in technical, highly specialized areas related to logic and logical semantics. Rorty believes that this loses the basic value of philosophy-an attempt to describe the relationship between theory and reality.
|
