IS ONE STRUCTURE ENOUGH TO DESCRIBE PHYSICAL REALITY?
E. A. Bezlepkin
Institute of Philosophy and Law, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 8 Nikolaeva str., Novosibirsk, 630090, Russia
Keywords: унификация, объединение, интертеоретические отношения, синтез, редукция, физическая картина мира, mathematical structure, Platonism, theory of everything, determinism, emergence, exceptionally simple theory of everything
Abstract
There are two philosophical prerequisites for creating a theory of everything, namely the possibility to describe the world with the help of (a) a single theoretical object and (b) a generalized mathematical structure. At present, the most popular theories of everything (superstring theory and loop quantum theory of gravity) exploit the first approach. The article considers an exceptionally simple theory of everything which is based on the second approach. The main point of the article is that a single mathematical structure is sufficient to describe only one level of physical reality. The article also considers main problems arising from such an assumption, namely the anthropologism of mathematics, the incompleteness of mathematics and the problem of deterministic description.
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