Home – Home – Jornals – "Philosophy of Education" 2015 number 5

This paper analyzes the concepts of «criterion» and «symptom» in the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The author discusses the theories of symptom and criterion set out in the «Blue Book», «Philosophical remarks» and «Philosophical Investigations». The author draws attention to the fact that in «Philosophical Remarks» Wittgenstein’s concepts of «symptom» and «criterion» were influenced by verificationism. The author also notes that the late Wittgenstein was convinced that the difference between criterion and symptom is vague, imprecise. The author analyzes the interpretation of the concept of identity both in the middle period of Wittgenstein’s career and in the later period. The author concludes that during the period of Wittgenstein’s philosophical activity we can observe a gradual convergence of the concept of «symptom» to the concept of «criterion» in the background of resolute rejection of the classical epistemological approach that distinguishes and isolates the subject from the object of cognition.