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
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
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
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« »	14 (33%)	4 (25%)	18 (31%)
« »	21 (50%)	6 (37,5%)	27 (47%)

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4	4	1	-	-	-
5	3	-	1	-	-
6	6	4	3	-	-
6	3	2	-	-	-
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	33	16	8	2	1

(43,7%)

« » (31,2%)

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 e-mail: maleva-tm@ranepa.ru).

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 , 11, -mail: kovalenko-ea@ranepa.ru).

DOI: 10.15372/REG20160407

*Region: Economics & Sociology, 2016, No. 4 (92), p. 153–175*

**T.M. Maleva, E.E. Grishina, E.A. Tsatsura**

## **MEANS-TESTING IN REGIONAL SYSTEMS OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE: HOW AND WHAT FOR?**

*The article analyzes changes in regional systems of social assistance after 2013. We have found out that regions introduce income and other additional social assistance eligibility requirements for children and families with children more frequently than for the elderly. Mainly means-testing is more often used in social assistance for children rather than for the elderly. Positive legislation changes aimed at lowering inclusion and exclusion errors are more common in social assistance for children. Changes in social assistance for the elderly*

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*tend to be more controversial—reducing the number of one type of errors and raising the number of others at the same time. In whole, regions pursue an asymmetric policy in means-testing implementation: some regard targeting as a means of higher priority in assistance for families while others decide to prioritize the elderly. Means-testing in the distribution of social support was used as an excuse for regional budget cuts in half of the cases. The size of provided benefits decreased, which reduced the effectiveness of anti-poverty measures. One-third of the cases showed a contradictory policy when means-testing did not result in the concentration of resources for most deprived sections of the population. However, in some cases, regions implemented means-testing in a more reasonable way when the introduction of income requirements was accompanied by an increase in the size of benefits. This experience can serve as a guide for regional policy in means-testing implementation.*

**Keywords:** targeting; means-testing; regional policy; social assistance for children; social assistance for the elderly

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### **Information about the authors**

*Maleva, Tatyana Mikhaylovna* (Moscow, Russia) – Candidate of Sciences (Economics), Director of the Institute for Social Analysis and Forecasting, RANEPa (11, Prechistenskaya Embankment, Moscow, 119034, Russia, e-mail: maleva-tm@ranepa.ru).

*Grishina, Elena Evgenievna* (Moscow, Russia) – Candidate of Sciences (Economics), Head of Laboratory at the Institute for Social Analysis and Forecasting, RANEPa (11, Prechistenskaya Embankment, Moscow, 119034, Russia, e-mail: grishina@ranepa.ru).

*Tsatsura, Elena Alekseevna* (Moscow, Russia) – Candidate of Sciences (Sociology), Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Analysis and Forecasting, RANEPa (11, Prechistenskaya Embankment, Moscow, 119034, Russia, e-mail: kovalenko-ea@ranepa.ru).

22.08.2016 .

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