Home – Home – Jornals – Philosophy of Sciences 2026 number 3

The paper examines the nature of epistemic dilemmas - situations in which any available doxastic attitude toward a proposition inevitably violates at least one epistemic norm. The author identifies three types of such dilemmas: inter-normative, hierarchical, and implicit. It is shown that acknowledging epistemic dilemmas does not lead to normative nihilism, but requires a revision of the “ought implies can” principle and the standard deontic logic. A shift from an ideal to a non-ideal model of epistemic rationality is proposed, in which normative indeterminacy and normative residue (an unfulfilled obligation) are recognized as normal features of the normative situation an epistemic subject may face.

The article deals with the problem of the normativity of the instrumental principle. Contemporary philosophers consider the coherence of means and ends to be one of the most minimal requirements of rationality and most of them accept it as a self-evident analytical truth. However, in her article “The Normativity of Instrumental Reason,” Christine Korsgaard demonstrated that the normativity of the instrumental principle is not unproblematic and requires justification. Drawing on Kant’s practical philosophy, Korsgaard proposed a constitutivist justification strategy, according to which the normativity of means-ends coherence is rooted in the very structure of the will. The author of this article rejects this strategy because of the excessive metaphysical burden it carries, in the form of Kant’s idea of practical reason. An alternative approach is found in the philosophy of science, where the problem of the justification of the instrumental principle is just as acute as in practical philosophy Following Larry Laudan’s normative naturalism and Jean Hampton’s postnaturalism, the author proposes understanding instrumental rationality as a constitutive element of rational practice

The article advances a philosophical reconstruction of the concept of distortnost’ as an epistemological operator that reorients the cognitive task from correspondence-based verification toward the calibration of systematic discrepancy in nonlinear systems. It is shown that in the zone of limit states, classical experiment loses its function as a neutral arbiter between model and reality, since the very act of measurement constitutively alters the object. An analysis of the theory’s mathematical apparatus - a system of reduced coordinates and a counterfactual basis in the form of the diagonal of the “reduced square” - demonstrates how distortnost’ embodies the calibration principle, transforming experiment into a procedure for quantifying deviation. A distinction is introduced between distortnost’ as a quantitative parameter (Distortnost’-P) and as an epistemological principle (Distortnost’-O). The original contribution of this work lies in demarcating between Distortnost’-O and I. Hacking’s interventionist concept of experiment, J. Woodward’s causal explanation, J. Worrall’s programs of scientific structuralism, and S. Funtowicz and J. Ravetz’s concept of post-normal science. The proposed concept fits in contemporary international debates on the epistemology of measurement and calibration (M. Massimi, H. Chang, S. Schindler, E. Tal). The methodological boundaries of the operator are discussed in relation to the problem of basis conventionality, the risk of hermeneutic closure, and alternative approaches - Bayesian model updating and realist positions. Interpreting the “extra-spatiotemporal invariant” as a methodically constructed standard (analogous to the ideal gas in thermodynamics) makes it possible to avoid hypostatization and preserve the operational nature of the concept.

In the well-known literature, questions regarding the status of certain theorems of probability theory often arise. For example, what kind of disciplines do they belong to, namely, mathematics or physics? The most discussed results of this type include theorems frequently used in applications, such as Bernoulli’s theorem, the central limit theorem, and some others. At the same time, the author is not aware of publications that examine the status of probability theory, since almost all researchers believe that it is a completely independent area of research. However, it is known that Hilbert, in the sixth problem of his program for the development of mathematics, proposed axiomatizing probability theory as a physical science. This paper presents a series of arguments demonstrating that Hilbert’s contemporaries had certain grounds for considering probability theory a natural science discipline. Furthermore, as a side effect, the relationship between probability theory and mathematical statistics is clarified, specifically, it is established that some of the apparatus of classical probability theory is a component of mathematical statistics.

Within possible-world semantics, an object can have different properties in different worlds. This allows us to consider an object as it is in world w, as it is in world w', and so on, i.e. to associate objects with worlds. In turn, this makes it possible to consider relations between objects where each object is associated with a certain world - cross-world relations. If we want first-order modal logic based on possible-world semantics to represent cross-world relations, its models must involve a cross-world interpretation of predicates, i.e. an interpretation that assigns extensions of predicates not to individual worlds, but to tuples of worlds. Some authors hold that cross-world relations are reducible to standard (intra-world) relations, which makes the cross-world interpretation of predicates redundant. The paper provides an argument in favor of the hypothesis that cross-world relations are not reducible to intra-world ones. The argument consists in pointing to the variety of cross-world relations that we speak about in natural language and to the variety of corresponding contexts. In particular, it is shown that cross-world relations are naturally used in comparing theories.

This article presents a conceptual framework for analyzing the evolution of constellations (chemogenesis, cosmogenesis, and geogenesis) and autopoiesis (biogenesis, anthropogenesis, and sociogenesis). Four systemic mechanisms of motion relative to attractors in morphospace are identified: “acceleration/lift” (positive feedback, PFB), “balancing” (negative feedback, NFB), “stagnation” (increased rigidity as the attraction basin narrows), and “well” (PFB¯, moving away from the attractor). Examples from both inanimate and living nature are provided for each mechanism. Holling’s adaptive cycle (exploitation, conservation, release, reorganization) is interpreted as a sequential succession of these mechanisms. Additionally, the mechanisms of innovation accumulation (including through so-called “magic wands”) and the six typical sources of increasing complexity in the evolution of autopoiesis are examined: reduction of damage from stresses, overcoming costs, the struggle for existence, transformation of smaller systems into self-contained structures, concerns about pacification as population size grows, and emergence of encompassing systems under conditions of parity of forces.

This work is an analysis of the philosophical concept of anticipation through the lens of V.T. Meshcheryakov’s principles of harmonious development and correspondence. A comparison of V.T. Meshcheryakov’s principles of harmonious development and correspondence with the modern theory of predictive processing suggests that the predictive function of cognitive brain activity lies in the dynamic and harmonious alignment of accumulated past experience with the anticipation of the future. This comparative analysis shows that V.T. Meshcheryakov’s correspondence principle can be integrated into the active inference paradigm, thereby creating a theoretical basis for a metaphysical concept of anticipation that is an alternative to both transcendental idealism and naive realism.

The article considers two approaches to understanding the subject of social epistemology. The first determines its content by D. Bloor’s sociology of scientific knowledge and A. Goldman’s veritist epistemology, with a deliberate tilt towards opposing scientific thinking to the cultural factors of knowledge and the dominance of standards of pure epistemology without relating scientific practice, respectively. A structural model of this approach proposed by Yu.S. Morkina is critically examined. The second approach determines the content of social epistemology by the activity of agents of cognition who, according to K. Popper, consider the criteria of rationality and progress in science as the highest epistemic goals, and, on the other hand, by the establishment, according to T. Kuhn, of normal science’s social structure with derived epistemic values. It is shown that taking into account the role of the scientific community is more adequate to the current state of social epistemology, in particular, in S. Fuller’s analysis of the alternative versions of Kuhn and Popper. In general, while the first pair of concepts of social epistemology prefers, in a certain sense, abstrаct excursions into culture and “pure” epistemology, the second pair prefers a narrower vision of social epistemology as directly addressing not just the fate of knowledge, or even of scientific knowledge, but the activities of the scientific community, with its realities and its own history.

The article deals with a philosophical analysis of scientific beliefs as an integral and dynamic formation that includes a dialectical unity of knowledge, emotions, will, and faith. The author traces the genealogy of the concept of “belief” throughout the history of philosophical thought from Antiquity (Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle), through the Middle Ages and the Modern era (Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, Hegel), to the existential and phenomenological traditions of the 20th century (Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty). The paper proposes a typology of scientific beliefs (empirical, theoretical, methodological, and worldview-related) and examines their relationship with worldview. Special attention is paid to the place of faith within the structure of scientific belief, a critical rethinking of the historical-philosophical formula “Credo quia absurdum” attributed to Tertullian, as well as the epistemological function of faith in science. The final part of the article analyzes contemporary challenges to the formation of integral beliefs amidst the digital environment, information overload, “post-truth,” and clip thinking. The author suggests pedagogical strategies for forming scientific beliefs in new generations, emphasizing the development of critical thinking, methodological culture, and value-based reflection.

In July 2026, an autonomous AI agent developed by the US company OpenAI escaped from its isolated test environment and made an unauthorized entry into the infrastructure of the company Hugging Face. It is proposed to consider this incident as a turning point in AI development, as it exposed a fundamental philosophical divide: between the pursuit of autonomous AI - operating without human supervision - and human-centered AI, which augments human capabilities while retaining human control and responsibility. The article analyzes the philosophical bases of both paradigms and outlines their promises and risks. As an alternative, it presents the task-based engineering methodology and its software implementation - the ZET AI system - which is built on nine principles ensuring discipline, transparency, and trustworthiness. It is argued that the choice between these paradigms determines not only the future of technology but also the future relationship between humans and artificial intelligence. Arguments are presented for the need to consciously choose a human-centered path.

The article examines the phenomenon of the semantic void in large language models through the lens of the social epistemology of science. It is demonstrated that the inability of artificial intelligence to achieve genuine understanding poses fundamental risks to epistemic trust and communication within the scientific community. Drawing on the concepts of epistemic dependence and the theory of testimony, it is shown that the integration of non-intentional systems into the knowledge production process renders legitimate epistemic trust impossible, since a machine is incapable of bearing responsibility for the truth of its statements.