Home – Home – Jornals – Philosophy of Sciences 2025 number 4

The article considers human cognitive abilities when modeling is actively used to understand and transform the external world. It discusses the prospects and possibilities of cognitive models and real experiments in studying physical objects and brain functions, as well as the limitations of objective research methods in studying mental processes that play an important role in forming a holistic view of world in the human mind.,

The article presents the phenomenon of cyborgization as a complex interweaving of technological and human practices. It is shown that the roots of cyborgization lie in ancient myths and prosthetic practices. Using examples from history and contemporary cases, the author argues that the expansion of capabilities through external devices alters ontological and epistemological frameworks: a synergistic effect arises, and subjective experience and cognition are transformed. Comprehending cyborgization within the framework of optimistic transhumanist discourse, technology critique, descriptions of hypothetical models such as the agro-cyborg, and the concepts of the anti-cyborg and “reverse cyborg” makes it possible to identify both the risks and potential of cyborg technologies. The author develops an integrative approach, that is, cyborgian eclecticism based on the interweaving of various theories and methodologies and the reflexive revision of priorities as new data emerges. This approach enables the development of recommendations for the integration of technologies into social processes in a way that promotes the protection of human values and takes into account the variability of the socio-technical context. Cyborgization thus appears not simply as a modification of the body and/or consciousness, but as a transformation of modes of being that requires philosophical understanding and flexible ethical guidelines.,

The article examines the evolution of the concept of relevance in scientific explanation in contemporary philosophy of science. The author demonstrates how classical formal models, such as Hempel and Oppenheim’s deductive-nomological model, have given way to a pluralistic approach that acknowledges multiple, context-dependent criteria of relevance. Three major challenges to the traditional paradigm are analyzed: (1) the epistemic shift from explanation to understanding as a primary epistemic goal; (2) technological challenges posed by “black-box” AI systems and the rise of explainable AI (XAI); and (3) the social and ethical responsibility involved in selecting which factors count as relevant in scientific explanations. In response, the author proposes an outline of the integrative model of explanatory relevance, which synthesizes three interdependent dimensions: ontological, epistemic, and social-normative. Within this model relevance is reconceptualized not as an external pragmatic constraint but as an internal epistemic norm that determines what deserves attention in scientific inquiry.,

The article focuses primarily on outlining the positions of critics of heavyweight ontology - deflationists and antirealists. The author shows that these positions do not entail the denial of metaphysics. The article begins with examples from the Russian-language discussion in which deflationism and antirealism in metaontology are associated with the denial of the existence of an independent reality - metaphysical antirealism. These examples fall within the general trend of confusing theses of scientific, metaphysical, and epistemological antirealism, as well as antirealism with respect to specific types of entities (sometimes relativism and skepticism are also included). Next, a terminological policy is proposed for distinguishing between ontology and metaphysics, as well as metaontology and metametaphysics. It is argued that these terms usually play a coordinating role in the discussion and do not require definition. At the same time, clarifying the coordination terms helps advance from debates about words to debates about substantive issues.,

The new issue of the Latin American semiotic journal “deSignis” (No. 41, July-December 2024) focuses on the topic of digital culture and memes. Leading semiotic experts from Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, and several European countries reflect on the phenomenon of the meme as part of the general digital culture in the context of the production and dissemination of meaning. The articles in the issue represent the so-called “third-generation semiotics”, which in the 21st century strives for an interdisciplinary dialogue with philosophy and anthropology.,

In the 1900s, D. Hilbert formulated his famous problems, and the sixth problem was intended to axiomatize probability theory as a physical science. In 1938, the axiomatics proposed by A.N. Kolmogorov were accepted as a working mathematical science. This raises a question that has been neglected in the established philosophical literature - why did Hilbert consider probability theory a physical science? The main goal of this work was to describe the characteristics of probability theory that are specific to the strong natural sciences. The author first presented some well-known considerations and examples on this subject. They were based on the concept of holism, which held that results, such as those obtained in statistical physics using probability theory, were not separated from probability theory itself. However, they are not sufficiently complete and thorough to consider probability theory a physical science. Then, the author formulated his own arguments. Thus, based on an analysis of the content of Bernoulli’s and Chebyshev’s theorems, he demonstrated that they allow for verification of the conditions of their applicability to the data being studied, and, in principle, a more complex verification of the adequacy of the results proven within them to these data. In addition, he demonstrated that a number of concepts of this science, such as independence and probability, allow for a general scientific interpretation. Therefore, probability theory is a mathematical science, which follows from the formal and abstract nature of its axioms, but it has some features characteristic of strict natural scientific and technical disciplines. The second part of the article is devoted to the study of the reasons for changing the status of applied statistics, since over the past decades in Western universities this science is no longer considered part of mathematics. As a result, on the basis of a substantive analysis of classical statistics, the author has shown that there are far more reasons for this discipline than for probability theory not to be considered an exclusively deductive science.,

Classically, physicists strived to assign some rigorous explanatory models to what happens in our phenomenal scope, and they surely succeeded. Nowadays, cognitive science tells us that our phenomenal representations, even being presumably structurally veridical, are made out of our inborn “mental paints” (Harman), such as light, colours, warmth, density, etc. According to professionally trained physics, the wave-particle duality is not at all paradoxical mathematically, only is it perceptually. Thus, one may conjecture that the rest of items of our physical ontologies may have been induced by our perceptual constitution, and if bats or robots did physics, their science, the set of its problems and their representations of facts could have substantially differed. Our physics uses categories (particles, waves) that feel natural to us because they’re built from our “mental paints” and predictive habits. A robot’s correlation-based science would skip these, suggesting our ontology isn’t inevitable. If perception is an evolved interface (Hoffman) and knowledge is a data-trained predictive model (Friston), then bats or robots would indeed craft different sciences. Our “problems” (e.g., wave-particle duality) might not even register with them. Big Data science hints that theory itself - our need to explain with entities like “fields” - might be a human peculiarity. An AI could deal with the same reality without our conceptual baggage, echoing Hoffman’s idea that we don’t see the “real” code. In sum, this suggests that the ontology of physics isn’t a direct window into reality but a human-constructed map, shaped by how evolution painted our interface and how our brains model the world. The mathematics might be universal (e.g., quantum equations), but the entities we project beyond - like waves or particles - are our own. Moreover, match or mismatch of an ontology and a theory can affect the latter’s efficiency.,

Quine’s philosophy is considered to be an important stage in the development of analytical philosophy. However, some researchers see in the philosophy of Quine and his followers “the decline of analytical philosophy in all but name.” The article discusses the reasons for this point of view by stating the incompatibility of the scientism of analytical philosophy and Quine’s thesis of the continuity of science and philosophy. It is shown that Quine’s thesis is based on an appeal to skeptical arguments that contradict the concept of scientism as such, since they include the following elements alien to science: holism (the Duhem-Quine thesis), the limitation of scientific and philosophical discourses to first-order logic, thought experiments (the “anthropological” argument about the uncertainty of radical translation), the revival of metaphysics (Quine’s criterion of existence and ontological obligations). The conclusion is made about the absence of scientism in Quine’s analytical philosophy as its essential characteristic. Although Quine’s advocacy of naturalism in philosophy is often considered as the evidence of its scientism, there are doubts about whether naturalism itself is compatible with analytical philosophy, as well as whether Quine is even an analytical philosopher in its current understanding.,

The article examines the problem of the limitations of empirical verification of geological hypotheses and shows how changes in researchers’ attitude towards this problem influenced the development of the philosophy of geology from the 19th to the 21st century.,

This article is a short essay in memory of the life and work of the outstanding contemporary philosopher of science, Professor Emeritus of the Faculty of Philosophy and Science at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam - Peter Paul Kirschenmann.,

This review analyzes key themes from the first volume of “Wittgenstein and Artificial Intelligence.” It addresses the metonymic trap in AI discourse, contrasts Chomsky’s and Brandom’s objections to strong AI, examines neural network opacity, and demonstrates how Wittgenstein’s anti-representationalism offers unique solutions to AI’s philosophical dilemmas.,