Home – Home – Jornals – Philosophy of Sciences 2023 number 2

The manifestation of the fear of the inquisition is treated as one of the range extremities of Descartes’ multilateral worldview and philosophical orientations. The point is made that the philosopher combined this fear with a sincere inner religiosity. It is noted that his religiosity was exactly like this due to almost ten years of study at a Jesuit college. And the news of the Inquisition verdict on Galileo actualized for Descartes the significance of his commitment to religious views. This commitment was manifested not only actively, but also militantly in Descartes’ speeches against two his opponents who showed it insufficiently in the philosopher’s opinion; those were the author who wished to remain anonymous and the Catholic priest Bourdin. It is revealed that due to such a degree of religiosity, Descartes was unable to adequately perceive and take into account in polemics with these authors their arguments in favor of recognizing the human mind not as an incorporeal substance, but as a product of the functioning of his corporeal brain. But if with regard to the anonymous author, Descartes had to be content with expressing his disagreement in a special article, then with regard to Bourdin, he did not limit himself to expressing his disagreement in a public polemic in the press, but also actually carried out a denunciation of the clergyman to his high-ranking church leader.

This research examines the emergence of formally represented knowledge, the order of its formalization and its prospects. The loss of the connecting links between reality and its formal descriptions resulted in a crisis of formalization of scientific knowledge. The article presents two basic approaches to solving information-technical problems - abstrаct-logical and engineering. It is shown how creative discomfort arises from excessive abstrаction. The issue of combining comprehended and reflexive components in making holistic decisions is investigated. Two ways of the formalization process are discussed - the explicit way and the shadow one, in which subjectively insignificant details and nuances are emasculated. Some terminological constructs that arose from the crisis of knowledge formalization, such as robotic ethics and artificial morality are considered. The conclusion is made about the increasing digitalization as a result of the crisis of the formal representation of scientific knowledge.

The article considers the emergence of science as a totality of reliable knowledge. A new synthetic approach is proposed that interprets the emergence of science as a collision of two radically different traditions - medieval scholasticism and natural philosophy of modern times. The theory of types of scientific rationality by V.S. Stepin is reconstructed and an extrapolation of post-non-classical rationality tendencies to the near future is proposed.

The object of this study is the principle of least action (PLA) taken in the dialectical unity of various aspects of its manifestation in philosophy and science. It also reveals the functional status of the PLA in working out and implementing the sustainable development strategy. The methodological basis of the study contains the ideas of classical philosophy, the ideas of L. Wittgenstein, the theoretical provisions of the French epistemological tradition, and the postmodern principles of J. Derrida’s deconstruction theory. The article substantiates the methodological significance of the PLA for fundamental ontology, for developing promising strategies of evolutionary adaptation, and for socio-ecological optimization.

The article deals with the problem of applying the concepts of “cause” and “causality” in social sciences. The author refers to analytical philosophy, where the issue of the legitimacy of using these concepts in scientific research and the problem of the possibility of building social sciences on the model of natural sciences were actively discussed. The study shows that the position of a particular philosopher concerning the strategy of building social sciences depends on his understanding of the role of causality in explaining the actions of an individual. Proponents of the standard (causal) theory of action take a positivist position and believe that social sciences should use the methods and approaches of natural sciences. On the contrary, representatives of the anti-causal wing believe that social sciences should use their own methodology. Hence, the solution of this problem should be preceded by the development of a theory of action.

The analytical method, understood as the main approach of analytic philosophy, can be treated as one of the practices that are supported in society, since they have a certain pragmatic significance for this society. In the first part of the article, we noted the need for a reform of the analytical method and showed that the basis for such a reform could be a performative approach, which recently has helped to restructure many fields of social and humanitarian knowledge. The performative approach make it possible to combine the analytical method with the methodology of social criticism, allowing to develop theories that have both analytical rigor and the necessary potential for solving current social problems. In the second part of the article, we turn to attempts of such combining and analyze its effects, in particular in analytical feminism, critical theory of gender and race, and modern social criticism in general.

The article analyzes the understanding of the essence of the future in such natural science disciplines as neurophysiology and general biology, as well as in the humanitarian sciences, namely psychology and cognitive science, that are joined with them. The data obtained suggest that the ability to imagine the future and the need to anticipate it are basic for all living organisms in general and humans in particular.

Newton developed a model of a new universality, or a homogeneous and isotropic world, which has uniform laws, in contrast to the Aristotelian concept of a hierarchical, multi-layer and specified cosmos. This model is based on a number of ontological postulates introduced by him, which can be identified among the provisions of his classical work. Newtonian mechanicalism is based on imputing universal simplicity to the world. Simplicity is determined by the general quantitative homogeneity of the universe, which has univalent internal structures - common elements and forces that can be calculated and used. The quantitative “unit” of a simple, homogeneous, physical-geometric universe is an ambivalent corpuscular point. The main constants of the “mechanistic universe” are the diversity of amounts of masses, motions and forces, quantized by clear mutual relations. Newton also introduced theoretical space and time as a privileged, absolute reference system. To harmonize the model of the physical-geometric universe with the sensually perceived, empirical reality, the third (astronomical) part of the “Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy” states the existence of “general properties” (qualities) of material bodies, which are obtained and verified only by experience. These are qualitative characteristics of length, hardness, impermeability, mobility and inertness. Finally, the Newtonian version of mechancalism has compulsorily metaphysical ingredients - inexplicable and transcendent qualities. These are gravity, ether and God. Thus, the ontological scheme of mechanicalism, looming in the so called “Gospel of science” of Modern times, looks like a construction based on a consistent thought experiment of representing the universe exclusively in terms of its “objectivity” and “sensory verifiability”.

The article identifies and examines four main directions in the development of corpuscular optics: those of Democritus-Gassendi, Anaxagoras-Hobbes, Philolaus-Descartes and Newton. It provides an epistemological assessment of the cognitive capabilities of corpuscular theories of light.

The article analyzes the shift that science is currently experiencing as a field of activity and an institution. It is concluded that there is a shift from science to technoscience or, more precisely, to biotechnoscience. This shift means a change in the basic setting. In the scientific paradigm, it was allowed to set on the knowledge of the world and the immutability of man as the subject of knowledge. In the techno-scientific paradigm, it is assumed that the world and man should be designed and changed to suit the engineering tasks of transformation. Man, as the main subject of change, should in principle be transformed and enhanced. The principle of human enhancement with the help of modern smart technologies is introduced. During shifting from science to technoscience, the boundary between science, culture, power and society becomes blurred and hybrid forms emerge, in which the production of new forms of life, including a new human project, becomes the basic process. In these hybrid forms, scientific knowledge ceases to be a purely epistemological unit, but integrates into large engineering projects.