SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY: A NEW LOGIC OF DISCOURSE
Oksana Ivanovna Tselishcheva
Institute of Philosophy and Law, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 8, Nikolaev st., Novosibirsk, 630090 Russia
Keywords: Fuller, Rorty, Heidegger, Kuhn, social epistemology, logic, discourse, argumentation
Abstract
The article deals with the criticism of the style of discourse adopted in social epistemology as an intermediate discipline in the structure of the humanities. It is shown that it weakens the requirements for logical rigor and coherence of the text. As an example, the author considers a part of the text of “Kuhn vs. Popper” - the book by S. Fuller, one of the founders and main representatives of social epistemology, in which the figures of T. Kuhn, M. Heidegger and R. Rorty are arbitrarily placed in a single narrative. The inconsistency and ad hoc nature of the new argumentation criteria introduced by Fuller legitimizing the conclusions of social epistemology are demonstrated with specific examples.
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