Home – Home – Jornals – Philosophy of Sciences 2021 number 2

We identify a number of Sextus Empiricus’ skeptical arguments that use assumptions about a holistic nature of the systems, which Sextus considers. All these systems contain mental objects. We construct a general formulation for the holistic assumptions used by Sextus, as well as reveal the specifics of the systems considered by Sextus. We point out the premises which are basic both to Sextus’ approach and modern versions of mental holism (M. Esfeld, etc.). Our interpretation uses the assumption that the intentional objects in Sextus’ arguments under consideration are internal, or mental, objects. In our formalization of Sextus’ statements, we use the notation of propositional attitudes reports with doxastic operators. We also use the assumption that the internal intentional object is an abstract object that encodes its characteristics - in accordance with E. Zalta’s approach to abstract objects.

The article states that the peculiarity of the objective-idealistic component of Descartes' philosophy lied in its theological character, represented by the Christian doctrine. In this component, the subject of attention are two aspects highlighted by Descartes himself - the one which can be perceived by the human mind and the one which is beyond perception. Accordingly, even the article identifies the first as irrationalistic and the second as pretending to be rationalistic. But further thorough analysis of the aspects of the content of Christian ideas about God, which Descartes considered to be accessible to the human mind, revealed their real irrationality, which Descartes himself did not notice.

The article studies how I. Kant’s works influenced the development of concepts in analytical philosophy and considers the evolution of referential categories. It affirms the historical continuity of the ontological metaphysical bases of referential categories in the works of the analytical philosophers (W. Quine, P. Strawson), the independence of the relevant aspects from the epistemological orientation of Kantian philosophy, and the plura-lity of ways by which the lines of Kantianism spreads.

We propose a generalization of David Egan’s structural analogy between Heidegger’s Angst problem and Wittgenstein’s rule-following problem to the case of the problem of hinge propositions, considered by Wittgenstein in his work On certainty . In our view, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy contains the notion of authenticity: the language games as new correct uses of Wittgensteinian rules are authentic. We treat the analogy between Heidegger and Wittgenstein from the point of view of a contextual realism. We also indicate that there are substantial differences in the approaches of the two philosophers.

The article discusses the main characteristics and features of the abduction method, studies the possibilities of using abduction and hybrid combinations of abductive and inductive approaches in modern digital science. It is shown that the complex use of inductive, deductive and abductive methodologies provides greater interaction and synergy in the formulation of new hypotheses and the search for cause-and-effect relationships. It is argued that in digital science, abduction must take into account the quality of big data and the context of big data generation.

The problem of persistence is one of the central problems in modern analytic metaphysics. Nevertheless, little attention has been paid to this topic in the Russian literature. The article concentrates on explication of the main theoretical solutions available within the framework of three-dimensional ontologies of persistence in time. The author analyzes the problem of temporary intrinsics and the available strategies for solving this problem, viz indexicalism and adverbialism. Then, he considers the paradox of constitution. First, the paradox itself is explicated. Second, the identification of the problem that makes the constitutive paradox seem problematic is proposed. Third, two classes of solutions to the paradox are studied: pluralism and monism.

The lack of direct traces of significant anthropogenesis processes requires an appeal to the theory of evolution as well as to epistemology. Productive ideas of the Russian evolutionism make it possible to integrate the opposing directions: neo-Darwinism (synthetic theory of evolution) and the concepts of orthogenesis (or nomogenesis). The principle of multilevel selection is developed in many works where the analysis of selection processes is carried out at the individual, group, and species level. Main drivers of evolution take place not just in organisms and genes but in the interaction of living systems with environmental niches while consolidating the consequences in genetic structures. This basic principle allows to build a corresponding framework of systemic and functionalist concepts. Expanding the nomological scheme of the scientific explanation by K. Hempel it possible to include various indirect data into deductive logical forms. The universal hypothesis takes the form of ‘the provision principle’: a structure as a new sapient trait provides a care. If heterogeneous consequences of a hypothesis of this type are tested and occur to be true, they confirm it. The components of the empirical hypothesis are judgments about the initial conditions and effects: the appearance of a certain sapient trait in a particular period of the anthropogenesis. The combination of theoretical and logical-methodological approaches is used to analyze the morphological sapientization (from Australopithecus to Homo sapiens) and the evolution of language (from social conditions of verbal communication and first proto-words to successive stages of proto-language and full-fledged language development).

Information has many interpretations, but there are strong arguments in favor of the fact that this phenomenon is objective and serves as an indicator of the complexity of the system. One of the bases for classifying its types may be the hierarchy of levels of material organization. Modern society has moved on to the systematic use of mostly physical information. Biological information, which is represented by genetic, nervous, and other signaling processes in organism, also appears to have a physical (in particular electromagnetic) and chemical shell, but is not reduced to the latter, because it expresses the properties of self-preservation and adaptation that are emergent qualities of the living matter. On the other hand, physical information has formed the global information environment, that is the infosphere, which has begun to have biological (stressful, maladaptive) effects on humans. The dual key to managing biological information and overcoming these negative effects is the further deepening of bioknoledge and ecoknowledge, as well as its active conversion into appropriate technologies. In the future, it becomes possible to regulate the information flow of the highest biological level, i.e. the biosphere, as well as to transit to the directed evolution. Since the management of bioinformation processes can directly affect the vital aspects of human life, the development of its strong limiting regulators is expected. They will have both bioethical and biolegal bases and suggest a complex anthropological expertise.

The article argues that according to R. Rorty, the main drawback of the central concept of analytical philosophy - the analysis of meaning-is the lack of continuity of schools and generations. Rorty traces the intermittent development of the analytical movement from G. Frege and B. Russell to the Oxford School of Ordinary language, and then to W. Quine and S. Kripke. The synopsis of the change in the concepts of analysis is presented for Rorty by S. Soames’ final description of the history of analytical philosophy as a change in technical, highly specialized areas related to logic and logical semantics. Rorty believes that this loses the basic value of philosophy-an attempt to describe the relationship between theory and reality.