Home – Home – Jornals – Humanitarian sciences in Siberia 2019 number

Rapid rural population growth in Siberia, and mainly agricultural nature of its development prompted rural economy’s rationalization. Siberian agronomic services solved the task. The article deals with the history of creation, dynamics of development, main directions and results of governmental agronomy service’s activity based on the analysis of Soviet and contemporary Russian historiography, a complex of statistical and reporting data. Established in 1892, the government agronomic service served the needs only of old-settlers’ villages. Several separate agronomic organizations appeared in the following years working in the resettlement areas, and Cossack territories. In 1910-1912, the government took steps to consolidate agronomists from different government departments into united governorate and regional organizations. The main activities were pest control, creating experimental and demonstration farms, spreading agricultural knowledge. Statistic data show that human resources and financing of governmental agronomy in Siberia developed faster compared with European part of Russia. This made it possible to address the backlog related to the later establishment of government agronomy. Shortcomings in the work remained, but they were associated with objective factors of huge and sparsely populated Siberian territories. Weak impact on the peasantry was the most important problem of agronomic work. The rational organization of economy did not become the desire of the broad masses of rural population.

The article objective is to analyze the project of agricultural development adopted for West Siberia northern regions in 1935. Assessing prospects for their further development, regional authorities set the main task to create powerful grain base there. It was intended to supply local population and meet intraregional needs. Put forward by the regional authorities, the project was approved by the Centre. Within five years, the project assumed the double increase of the arable lands, the expansion of motor and tractor stations’ network, provision of northern farms with equipment, and animal husbandry development. The project included socio-political measures in addition to economic ones. According to the political leadership’s opinion, the kulaks opposition in collective farms of northern regions hampered implementation of the project. It justified carrying out a “cleaning” campaign against the management of collective farms, which took place in spring-summer of 1936. The objective reason for this was that the state agrarian policy was opposed by leaders and ordinary members of newly created collective farms in the northern regions. Besides, the post of party organizer was introduced in the collective farms of the northern regions. The project of agrarian development was not implemented, but the repressive campaign of 1936 became its most prominent episode. Acreages remained virtually unchanged, and new motor tractor stations were small and not provided with their own repair base. The reasons that led to the project failure included both overestimating the agricultural sector potential of northern regions, and shortcomings of the Soviet economy planned system. The subjective factor - changing leadership of the Novosibirsk region that was allocated from West Siberian territory in 1937 - played a certain role.

The article highlights the attempt of the transition to grass-fallow rotation system undertaken in the second half of the 1930s in Siberia. The analysis is carried out in the context of the Soviet state agrarian policy and ideological-theoretical struggle in the agronomic science. The author states that forced collectivization caused a deep crisis of agriculture. Refusal of crop rotations was one of the factors that led to decline of soil fertility and low yields. In 1932, the country’s leadership indicated the need to implement crop rotations in collective and state farms. Defining an optimal farming system for the country as a whole and its individual regions was the subject of a discussion between the supporters of fallow and grassfield farming systems. In 1933, the decision was made in favor of grass-fallow rotation system. Ineffectiveness of grass-fallow rotation with minimum fertilizers changed the viewpoint of the country’s leadership. The task to introduce grass-fallow rotation system was put on the agenda. The choice was based on the lack of mineral fertilizers, as well as the need to strengthen the husbandry fodder base. In late 1936, the government authorized the transition to grass-fallow rotation system in southern part of West Siberia. In June 1937, the Central Committee plenum of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) approved the transition to the grass-fallow rotation system at national level. At the same time, it was necessary to prevent reducing grain crops area. The grain loss caused by the widespread introduction of the grass rotation system was intended to be compensated by expanding the arable land area due to the virgin and fallow land development in the country’s eastern regions including South-West Siberia. In 1940, mass plowing of virgin and fallow lands began in the region. The rate of introducing grassland crop rotation was slow. In fact, the regional predominant farming system was a fallow crop three-field system in the early 1940s.

The article objective is to identify specifics of development of the state’s agricultural technology policy during the post-war Stalinism and “Khrushchev” decades and measures implemented by the Soviet government to develop the agricultural technology in the collective and state farms of Siberia. The study objective is to represent the scale and results of introducing modern systems of agriculture at the time, as well as the level of management culture. The author concludes that intensive methods were used to increase grain production during the period under review. The strategies of ecological technologies (herb crops, fallow lands, field-protective forest planting, land reclamation, etc.) and agriculture chemicalization (application of mineral fertilizers, herbicides and other means) were used in the policy of intensifying agriculture. The first strategy was deemed to be the “main” by the government in the second half of the 1940s and early 1950s. The emphasis was on introducing the grassland system without large capital investments. Applying this agricultural technology did not lead to increase in productivity of arable lands in the collective and state farms. N. S. Khrushchev called to abandon it completely. Expensive chemicalization was envisioned mainly in plans of agricultural development implemented only in the mid-1960s, when the comprehensive program appeared to intensify agricultural production with sufficient financial support. During the period under review, the authorities expected to increase agricultural production, primarily of grain, with extensive development of virgin and fallow lands. During the “Khrushchev” decade, it became the main lever to revitalize agriculture. Considerable funds were invested in the industry thanks to the virgin soil campaign; the country received additional grain yields. The reverse side of the new lands development was a significant drop of qualitative indicators of agricultural production.

The article investigates mechanisms of wheat purchase in foreign markets in connection with the grain crisis of 1963 in the USSR based on the documents of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium. It shows the process of negotiations and grain purchase by the Soviet government delegation in Canada, as well as analyzes the reasons, why the Soviet Union was unable to buy grain in the USA. The author believes that main reasons of the negotiations failure were related to the fact that the US leadership, unlike the Canadian government, pursued not only economic, but also political goals (attempts to strengthen the Democratic Party positions before the presidential elections of 1964 and to form a new political course of J. K. Kennedy). However, the protracted negotiation process, American bureaucratic machine’s clumsiness, and strengthening positions of the conservative force led to the negotiations’ termination. The author concludes that resolution of the bread shortage problem in the USSR became possible thanks to the Soviet diplomats’ efforts. At the same time, grain purchases abroad affected N. S. Khrushchev’s image and became one of the reasons for his resignation in October 1964.

The first part of the article was published in the previous issue (2018, N 4). This is its second part, which reconstructs the viewpoint of N. Ya. Gushchin, a famous Russian historian, in the collectivization debates of 1970s-1980s. A key event in the context of the studied issues was the XVI Session of the Symposium on Agrarian History of Eastern Europe (Chisinau, 1976), where sharp debates about kulaks’ social nature took place between V. P. Danilov, who claimed that kulaks and peasants were the same, and N. Ya. Gushchin, who insisted on their fundamental differences. Later N. Ya. Guschin took an active part in development of new approaches to study collectivization. At the turn of 1980s and 1990s he paid more attention to analyzing the political aspects of the problem and linked the agrarian policy’s difficulties with the wrong course of political power. At the same time, he came closer to the views then expressed by V. P. Danilov.

The Siberian Governors-Generals’ reports are repeatedly used by historians to study the regional administrative management, its socio-economic and cultural development, but so far they have not been the subject of special research in terms of identifying top authorities’ views on the region. The authors consider the Governor-Generals’ reports as a collective source text, whose parts were compiled by different persons, specialists in various fields, but signing it the Governor-General took responsibility for its content however difficult the process of the document's preparing might be. Representations of Siberia in the Governor-General’s reports were formed and evolved under the influence of a number of factors: first, their own direct impressions, changed and supplemented over time; second, reading the reports of predecessors and subordinates, as well as fiction, scientific, journalistic literature; third, familiarity with the complaints and petitions of individuals and groups. The understanding of the central authorities’ goals and policy influenced the way of presenting the data included in the report, as well as content of certain provisions; the Governor-General’s attention to certain aspects of his activities depended on tasks before him. The reports’ analysis shows that these documents do not always show the views of a particular Governor-General. Sometimes it is a list of materials, more or less reliable, received from subordinates of different levels. Often, several fragments were reproduced from one report to another, even when the Governor was replaced by his successor. In some cases, the Governors-General were the reports’ authors themselves. However, the report was a product of collective efforts most often. It was a common practice to repeat texts close to the governors’ reports. The Governor-General himself could not be completely sincere, he could, and sometimes did (consciously or unconsciously), try to influence the Monarch and/or Ministers, and other Supreme power and Central administration figures, highlighting certain characteristics, forming the image that should have been formed in the reports’ addressees.

The article aims to analyze command and control methods employed by the general of infantry N.N. Myraviov, Viceroy of the Caucasus and Commander of Separate Corps of the Caucasus in the course of the Köprüköy operation, which was an important episode of 1855 Caucasian campaign of the Crimean War. Historiography offers limited coverage of the operation with no attempts to analyze it in the context of the evolution if military art in the 19th century. This paper uses comparative approach to study the Köprüköy operation of the Crimean War of 1853-1856 through the lens of the Königgrätz operation of the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. It pays specific attention to N.N Muraviov’s and Helmuth von Moltke’s command and control methods. Analysis of the Köprüköy operation reveals that the plan of a concentric advance against the Turkish forces defending the approach to Erzurum demanded establishing effective cooperation between the two groups of advancing Russian forces: Alexandropol force under personal command of Muraviov and Erivan force led by major-general A.A. Suslov. The Viceroy’s propensity toward detailed command, overcentralized control, and suppression of initiative among subordinate officers prevented the establishment of such cooperation. This allowed the Turkish forces to retreat unhindered from their threatened position at Köprüköy to Deve-boyunu mountain ridge. On the contrary, Helmuth von Moltke in 1866 succeeded in establishing decentralized mission command, thus ensuring a victorious end for the Königgrätz operation. Thus, despite Russian generals in the Caucasus being fully capable of operating successfully under mission command, as demonstrated by the 1854 campaign, the Viceroy of the Caucasus failed to fully grasp the demands of his operational situation and contemporary military art. In addition to limiting the eventual success of Russian forces in Eastern Anatolia, this failure also illustrates the limited degree of susceptibility that Russian high command demonstrated toward new trends in operational art.

The article objective is to study the issue of cessation the gendarme supervision of private gold mining industry in Siberia in the late XIX century. The author solves following tasks: 1) to identify reasons that prompted the authorities to raise the issue of such supervision's liquidation; 2) to determine interests of the officials concerned in this matter; 3) to reveal mechanisms of the officials’ interaction in solving this problem. The main research sources are the materials of the Central Gendarme Department stored in the State Archives of the Russian Federation, as well as regional archives data. The main research approach is comparative historical analysis. The author came to several conclusions. The problem of cessation of the gendarme supervision of private gold mining industry had been considered for more than a decade. There were reasons that prompted the authorities and officials to take this step in the late XIX century: a number of workers’ protests in the gold mines decreased; the mechanism of gold mining and gold incomings to the state treasury was adjusted; and the main reason was the need to use gendarmes in the fight against the revolutionary movement at the vast Empire space, according to author’s viewpoint. The initiative to liquidate supervision came from the central government agencies - the Ministry of State Property and the Ministry of Finance considered inappropriate to maintain supervision and its financial support. The Gendarme Department, on the contrary, spoke in favor of maintaining this supervision. Addressing this issue, it turned out to be necessary to appeal to representatives of the Siberian executive power -governor-generals and governors, whose opinions were taken into account. As a result, the view on the necessity to liquidate the supervision and use gendarmes for solving other governmental tasks won, and since the second half of the 1880s gendarme officers ceased to supervise the private gold mining industry in Siberia.

There is still no consensus among historians about the national communists - who they were - the imperial policy conductors, or defenders of interests of non-Russian peoples. The activity of Stepan Vasilyevich Vasilyev, a party-Soviet leader, was hushed up as a “bourgeois nationalist” for many decades, but in the post-Soviet period some publicists tried to evaluate him as an “apologist for Stalinism”, which distorted the truth as well. The article objective is to study Vasilyev’s activities to resolve “the national issue” to form the nationhood in the autonomy form, his role in economic and social development of the republic and the country in the context of network interrelations between central and regional political elites. The research is based on L. P. Repina’s method of cultural and intellectual history involved studying and understanding the historical process through a personal context. The authors conclude that the desire for knowledge, work capacity and organizational experience allowed Vasilyev to grow professionally from a Komsomol leader to a statesman of all-Union scale for a short period. His historical merit was economic and socio-cultural modernization, which led to economic, social and cultural leveling of Yakutia’s development with the center. This period was marked by the formation and development of the Yakut nation, national statehood, economic and socio-cultural revival, and growing intellectual potential. Stepan Vasilyevich stood at the origin of Yakutian gold mining industry. Moscow patrons, Yaroslavsky and Ordzhonikidze, helped him in his professional activities, but the repression of the 1930s destroyed the existing model of social networks between the central and regional elites.

This article explores the establishment and activity of the Natural History Department of the Institute for Siberian Studies (ISS) based on a wide range of sources and scientific literature. The study is of high relevance due to the need to analyze a new model of scientific structure established by the Siberian scientists during the crisis period of Russian history. The study objective is to reconstruct and interpret the history of creation and work of the Natural History Department of ISS. The natural history studies initially were supposed to be conducted in four separate departments: botany, zoology, agriculture, and forest science. However, during the approval of ISS Regulations by A.V. Kolchak’s Russian government these departments were reorganized into sub-branches of the Natural History Department. It is worth noting that some distinguished scientists from Siberia, European Russia and foreign countries worked at the department, such as P. N. Krylov, V. V. Sapozhnikov, M. D. Ruzsky, G. E. Ioganzen, A. G. Gennkel, I. I. Podpera, S. A. Teploukhov, et al. The research has revealed the multidimensional activity of the Natural History Department. It arranged expeditions to study the Ob and Taz Bays’ tundra terrain, investigate ichthyofauna of West Siberian rivers (Ob, Tom, Tobol, Polui, etc.), phytoplankton of Lake Baikal and others. According to the expeditionary results, the members of the Department published a number of scientific works in “Izvestiya IIS”. The Department put forward the idea of organizing courses to train researchers of Siberian wild life, as well as the sub-department of physical geography; supported the Baikal Hydrobiological Station activity; sponsored the activities of the South Usuriisk Branch of the Russian Geographical Society, etc. The author concludes that the difficult political, social and economic conditions adversely affected the Department’s activity, not allowing its members to realize many ideas. However, if ISS were not closed by the Soviet authorities, its work would have developed on an even larger scale.

The main objective of this article is to analyze the first phase of Stalin’s mass repressions against the top-ranking officials of the Communist youth league (Komsomol) in 1937. The study focuses in particular on the role of the Komsomol General Secretary A.V. Kosarev regarding the implementation of Stalin’s murderous policy against the functionaries of the Komsomol at the onset of the Great Terror. Based on the widespread viewpoint that Kosarev’s intentions were to temper the terror impact on his organization upper ranks, the article scrutinizes the meeting of Stalin and Kosarev 21 July 1937, and proves that such allegations are most likely unfounded. The reassessment of the well-known sources as well as new archival material led to the assumption, that Kosarev’s role in Stalin’s repressive policy was not only of a “pawn” on the chessboard of power, who followed his master’s wishes blindly. On the contrary, the author shows that Kosarev was a single-minded, powerful functionary, who was keen to protect his own interests and tried to use the Great Terror to pursue his own goals. Even if he was seeking to mitigate the effects of the purges, his primary goal was to cover himself and his close associates against the possible accusations by NKVD. All his attempts to protect his promotees from the persecution and detention failed. Finally, he was forced to bend to Stalin’s will; this helped him to avoid being arrested, even if not for a too long time.

The study objective is to identify political, legal and socio-economic components of the post-war campaign aimed by the state at combating embezzlements of socialist property, as well as to assess the specifics of its implementation in the context of the mobilization economic model. The post-war period was marked by the growing number of thefts of socialist property, which were fixed in different social strata and professional groups of the Soviet society differing in the volume of the stolen and motivation of the committed act. The analysis of the social specificity of the campaign against embezzlements of the socialist property allows us to conclude on the inequality of sanctions against the Soviet society’s different groups. The campaign was aimed against the country’s ordinary people and led to strengthening control and introducing criminal sanctions against citizens. The task of eradicating thefts in the higher echelons of power was not set in the post-war years (although bodies focused on this task were created). The activities of the Ministry of State Control of the USSR to identify thefts in the ranks of the Soviet party and economic elite had a purpose to scare the nomenclature who wanted to live for their own pleasure after the war. The campaign’s intensity decreased in 1948, which manifested in lower number of people convicted for thefts and reducing the powers of organizations that controlled the financial and economic activities of ministries and departments. Taking into account the campaign socio-political specifics, it should be considered as a tool of mobilization economic model aimed at the post-war reconstruction of the Soviet national economy ravaged by the war.

The article subject is problems of mortality due external causes in Russia. The author presents results of reconstruction of its dynamics and structural characteristics in the Soviet era’s last decades. The paper objective is to examine the mortality due external causes in the villages of East Siberia as an indicator of the rural society life quality. It shows the mortality dynamics level and structure over thirty years at the end of the Soviet period; reveals features of this process in Siberia. The author explains specifics of mortality among Siberians taking into account the complex impact of natural and climatic, economic, socio-cultural factors; compares mortality processes in Siberian villages with similar ones in regional cities and villages of Russia as a whole. Based on official statistics, the article shows that the mortality from injuries in East Siberian villages developed following the all-Russian pattern. It grew throughout the whole country, but in the region’s countryside its level, dynamics and structure were of extraordinary nature. The death rate grew in the villages of the region faster than in the cities and in Russian villages in general and more than doubled in three decades. External influences ranked second in the structure of the overall mortality causes of Siberians throughout the period. The regional villages forged ahead in Russia in all types of traumatic mortality. The article provides statistics on the main classes of the most common death causes. It proves that the mortality crisis in East Siberia was more acute than anywhere in the country, and that the high mortality of Siberians was determined by both behavioral, environmental and economic factors.

The author has consistently and comprehensively studied the indicators and reasons of cardinal population changes in the country in the 1990s, analyzing the current demographic development of Kazakhstan during the period of independence. The article defines the “terms” encountered in the process of studying the demographic situation in the republic. It shows the main stages of Kazakhstan demographic development during the transition period based on statistical indicators synthesis. In theoretical and methodological regard, the study considers the role of an individual as the main participant in the migration process. The author carries out analysis of problems of the history of the Kazakh diaspora and issues of its repatriation to the historical homeland; considers the reasons of migratory processes, adaptation and integration of “oralmans” in the Kazakhstan society in a context of its growing human capital and intellectual potential. It shows their contribution and role in developing language, traditions, customs and culture of the Kazakh people. Nowadays migration is a factor in restoring the demographic balance in the republic. The article investigates and represents factors influencing the population abundance change and growth, the birth rate increase, the economic processes role in the transition period and their effect on socio-demographic processes. It examines the ethnic history in the Kazakh context. The study objective is to trace the history of ethnic groups settlement in the country, to characterize the modern demographic condition of Kazakhstan people taking into account its specifics. The article is of interest as an experience of studying the ethnos migration process (including “oralmans”), which has been formed and transformed during the XX-XXI centuries in Kazakhstan. In the article the interethnic relations viewed through the prism of profound changes in the ethnic composition of Kazakhstan population.

The history of scientists’ cooperation between the Siberian region of Russia and the Republic of Belarus has not been covered in historiography yet. The article objective is to reconstruct the history, study the current state of international research cooperation between the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus in the 1990-2000s identifying its main areas. The roots of scientific collaboration of the Siberian Branch of RAS and the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus can be traced back to the mid XX century. In 1957, when the largest integrated scientific center in the USSR started to be created in Siberia, the representatives from European scientific schools, including those from the Belorussian SSR, came to work in its new institutes. Siberian scientists of the Belarusian origin working in scientific institutions of Siberia are well known to the world scientific community for their contribution to the relevant fields of knowledge, among them are geologist A.A. Trofimuk, chemist V.A. Koptyug, physical chemist V.N. Parmon. In the post-Soviet period, it was the “Belarusian vector”, that played the decisive role in restoring international cooperation with scientists from neighboring countries. The integration ties established between the Siberian and Belarusian institutions in the Soviet period since the early 1990s underwent significant changes and took on new meaning. The article analyzes the key areas of international collaboration of which the most significant part was implementing joint research projects. The author concludes that the experience gained by scientists of SB RAS and the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus in this sphere is unique and needs further study and synthesis. The study sources include published reports on research and organizational activities of SB RAS, materials of the SB RAS’ Presidium and press.

The authors carry out a comprehensive study of the 25-year process of forming and functioning of “The Museum of Science and Technology of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences” based on a wide range of sources for the first time in historiography. The Museum is an important part of the diversified museum network of the Siberian Branch of RAS consisting of 37 museum-type structures within the research institutions. The paper presents funds, exposition, research and cultural and educational activities. The Museum has an extensive field-specific multidisciplinary collection including unique rare items. A significant part of the Museum collection has found its place in the exhibition built on principles of complexity, attraction, interactivity. Subjects are classified in six areas: computer science, instruments and equipment of scientific experiment, radio and communication, transport, film photography, microscopy. The main direction is “Computing” reflecting its development «from abacus to the computer» and containing seven sections: means of instrumental accounts, computers for collective use, mini-machines, microprocessor technology, analog computers, original designs of the Siberian Branch of USSR Academy of Sciences, educational and game complex “Igroteka”. The Museum develops actual innovative forms - introduces IT-technologies, interdisciplinary projects, systemic partnership, training (“Igroteka”) and recreational (“Museum night”) practices and communications representing intangible scientific heritage based on the museum activity traditional forms. The excursion program includes practices of numeration, programming and using equipment. The Museum is a base for educational practice, holds many open thematic events. “The Museum of Science and Technology SB RAS” successful activity contributes to a high level of organization the culture of life in Akademgorodok strengthening its official status as a historical attraction of regional importance.