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Humanitarian sciences in Siberia

2016 year, number

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CENTER AND WEST SIBERIAN KRAIKOM ON GRAIN PROCUREMENT IN 1931-1932

V.B. Laperdin
Institute of History SB RAS, 8, Nikilaev street, Novosibirsk, 630090, Russia
Keywords: аграрная политика государства, крестьянство, хлебозаготовки, Западно-Сибирский крайком, Р.И. Эйхе, agrarian policy of the state, peasantry, grain procurements, West Siberian regional committee, R. I. Eikhe

Abstract

The article analyzes relations between the leadership of West Siberian regional committee (Kraikom) and Politburo on the issues associated with the grain procurement campaign in 1931-1932. Such analysis will help to better understand the role of party regional representatives in Stalin’s agricultural policy. While on the whole remaining supporters of changes that took place in the Soviet countryside, the regional authorities could also adjust their course. In terms of grain procurement it led to controversy with the Central Commitee on timing and volume of harvested grain. The final plan for grain procurement campaign of 1931-1932 in West Siberia was a result of long negotiations between central and regional leaders. Unrealistic objectives set by Politburo, caused a negative response from the regional committee. R.I. Eikhe, First secretary of West Siberian regional committee, repeatedly appealed to the central government to reduce the plan. In August 1931 he proposed to reduce the grain procurement quota from 100 to 65 mln. puds, explaining this by drought and crop failure that struck the main grain-growing areas of the region. This argument was supported by disappointing messages about the scope of disaster. In addition, R.I. Eikhe received moral support from the heads of other regions, who also had to ask Politburo to reduce the grain procurement plan. The West Siberian regional committee serving its own interests took a defensive stance that fit into common actions of other regional party organizations. Politburo had to make concessions, reducing plan to the proposed 65 million puds. It is noted that the final plan was a result of compromise. Procurement organizations collected required amount of grain, but this was detrimental to the food, forage and seed funds of collective farms. It also impacted negatively on agricultural economy of region and material well-being of peasants.